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Prior literature documents a positive association between union power, calculated using 
industry-level union data, and information asymmetry. Prior literature also finds a mitigating 
effect from employee ownership on the negative association between union power and voluntary 
disclosure. Using a sample of company observations for fiscal years 2008 through 2010, I 
examine the effect of company-specific measures of employee unionization on market-based 
measures of information asymmetry (proxied for by insider trading activity, analyst following, 
and analyst dispersion). I also examine whether employee ownership impacts the effect of 
company-specific measures of employee unionization on my market-based measures of 
information asymmetry. I find mixed results that provide ambiguous evidence about whether 
employee unionization affects information asymmetry and whether employee ownership affects 
the impact of employee unionization on information asymmetry. These results suggest that 
industry-level unionization measures provide differing results from company-specific 
unionization measures and that the impact of unions on information asymmetry is unclear. These 
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The role that labor unions play in a company’s information environment is not clear. 
Understanding this role is a vital component in understanding the bigger picture of whether 
unions provide an overall net benefit or net cost to companies, stakeholders, the economy, and 
society in general. This debate over whether unions provide value is of interest to the 
government, the public, and academicians, as reflected in public policy, social and traditional 
media coverage, public opinion polls, and academic research. For example, between 2012 and 
2014, the United States (U.S.) Congress and thirty-three state legislatures introduced right-to-
work legislation which weakens the power of labor unions.1 Articles documenting the steady 
decline in U.S. union membership over the last thirty years are common in the popular press.2 
High activity on twitter with posts related to labor unions provides further support to the idea that 
the public is engaged in the discussion about the costs and benefits of labor unions.3 Finally, 
academic literature in multiple disciplines continues to examine the costs and benefits of unions 
(e.g., Ruback and Zimmerman 1984, Kleiner and Bouillon 1988, Leap 1991, Scott 1994, 
Reynolds et al. 1998, Schwab and Thomas 1998, Frost 2000, Hilary 2006, Chen et al. 2012, 
Farber et al. 2012, Chyz et al. 2013, Gomez and Tzioumis 2013). In this paper, I examine 
whether the presence of labor unions influences information asymmetry between company 
insiders and other market participants and whether any effect of unions on information 
asymmetry is affected by employee ownership.  
                                                 
1 http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx. 




3 http://topsy.com/. As of 6:00 p.m. central time on 5/30/15, there were 9,037 tweets using 




Information asymmetry occurs when market participants are not privy to private 
information that insiders or other market participants are privy to. Prior literature concludes that 
information asymmetry impedes the efficient allocation of resources in a capital market (Healy 
and Palepu 2001). For example, prior literature documents an increase in liquidity, an increase in 
information intermediation, and a decrease in the cost of capital with an increase in disclosure 
(Healy and Palepu 2001).4 Given the potential implications of information asymmetry between 
insiders and market participants, if unionization impacts information asymmetry it clearly should 
be included as part of the calculation of the ultimate costs and benefits of unions. 
There are many different reasons why managers prefer to keep some information private. 
For example, management has incentives to hide information about perquisites, excessive 
compensation, empire building, and other endeavors that personally benefit management at the 
expense of investors or other market participants from investors in order to maintain their 
position. The presence of a unionized workforce may decrease managements’ incentives to be 
forthcoming about company information that could be used in union negotiation, suggesting an 
increase in information asymmetry. Prior literature provides evidence that management has an 
incentive to obfuscate information that unions can use in labor negotiations (e.g., Ruback and 
Zimmerman 1984, Kleiner and Bouillon 1988, Leap 1991, Scott 1994, Reynolds et. el 1998, 
Frost 2000, Hilary 2006).  
On the other hand, labor unions may have incentives to monitor companies’ financial 
reporting. For example, labor unions have incentives to obtain information from management 
that may be useful in labor negotiations (such as detailed financial information not required to be 
                                                 
4 Economic theory suggests that, in the absence of disclosure costs, companies should entirely 




disclosed) and may be able to demand such information under threat of strike or other employee 
action, which would lead to a decrease in information asymmetry. Prior literature also provides 
evidence that unions may serve as external monitors, similar to institutional investors (e.g., 
Schwab and Thomas 1998, Chen et al. 2012, Farber et al. 2012, Chyz et al. 2013, Gomez and 
Tzioumis 2013). If unions act as monitors, I would expect their presence to reduce information 
asymmetry, similar to the board monitoring and discipline of management solution for 
information asymmetry proposed by Healy and Palepu (2001). Thus, unionized companies may 
have higher information asymmetry as compared to non-unionized companies because they 
increase management incentives to obfuscate information or they may have lower information 
asymmetry as compared to non-unionized companies because of unions’ ability to demand this 
information or because of company monitoring by unions. 
Hilary (2006) explores this idea and finds a positive association between unionization and 
information asymmetry. Using an industry-wide average as a proxy for each company’s level of 
unionization, rather than using a company-specific measure, Hilary (2006) finds a positive 
association between companies’ unionization rates and information asymmetry. Because 
unionization rates vary within industries, the measure results in misclassified companies and may 
not provide results that allow for interpretation about the effect of unions on an individual 
company’s information environment. In this paper, I extend this work by examining the effect of 
employee unionization on information asymmetry using a company-specific measure of 
unionization. 
Using a sample of company observations for fiscal years 2008 through 2010, I examine 
the association between measures of information asymmetry and unionization. I use the net 




information asymmetry. Such measures provide insight about whether unions affect information 
asymmetry in a way that is meaningful to market participants (e.g., by affecting managements’ 
ability to extract rents and/or by affecting the level and quality of information available for 
making informed investment decisions). I use disclosure of a labor union in a company’s 10-K, 
the rate of unionization disclosed in a company’s 10-K, and whether a company has high 
unionization (measured as a unionization rate in the top decile of sample observations), as 
measures of employee unionization. I find that there is a positive association between  the net 
purchase ratio of insider shares traded and the presence of a union, but no association between 
the net purchase ratio of insider shares traded and either the rate of unionization or high 
unionization. I also find that there is a negative association between analyst following and all 
three of my measures of employee unionization. Finally, I find that there is a negative 
association between analyst dispersion and the presence of a union, but no association between 
analyst dispersion and either the rate of unionization or high unionization.  
The incentives for unions to behave as monitors, similar to institutional investors, may be 
higher in the presence of employee ownership and may mitigate managements’ incentives to 
obfuscate information in the presence of unions. If employees are also owners, employees’ 
incentives to extract rents during labor negotiations (along with managements’ incentives to hide 
information that can be used for such rent extraction) should decrease as employees’ incentives 
become aligned with owners, suggesting a decrease in information asymmetry. Consistent with 
this idea, prior literature provides evidence that employee ownership may reduce managements’ 
incentives to obfuscate information in the presence of unions (Bova et al. 2015). Bova et al. 
(2015) develop an analytical model predicting that employee ownership should reduce 




increasing voluntary disclosure. In empirical tests, they find a positive association between 
voluntary disclosure and the probability of employee ownership in the presence of labor unions.5 
Like Hilary (2006), their study uses an industry measure of unionization, rather than a company-
specific measure. A natural extension of Bova et al. (2015) is to examine the impact of employee 
ownership on the effect of unionization on market-based measures of information asymmetry, 
which should provide insight about whether employee ownership affects the availability or 
usefulness of information about unionized companies. 
I extend this work by examining the impact of employee ownership on the effect of 
employee unionization on insider trading activity, analyst following, and analyst dispersion using 
company-specific measures of unionization. I find that employee ownership does not impact the 
association between measures of employee unionization and the net purchase ratio of insider 
shares traded. I find that high employee ownership mitigates the negative association between 
employee unionization and analyst following. I find mixed results for the impact of employee 
ownership on the effect of employee unionization on analyst dispersion, some of which 
contradict my analyst following results. Taken together, my results provide ambiguous evidence 
about whether employee ownership impacts the effect of employee unionization on information 
asymmetry, likely because of competing incentives for both managers and employees as 
documented in the prior literature. In additional analysis, I add governance control variables to 
my models and find similar results. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I discuss the background of the 
union debate, prior literature, and develop my hypotheses in section 2. I discuss my unionization 
                                                 
5 Bova et al. (2015) use management guidance, conference calls, and annual report readability as 




data and measures in section 3. I present empirical models and report results in section 4. I 
present additional analysis in section 5, and I conclude in section 6. 
2. BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE, AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Union Value Debate and the Decline of Union Membership 
Recent federal and state legislative attention highlights the intense debate surrounding the 
costs and benefits of unions. For example, in the past 5 years, three pieces of union-related 
legislation have been hotly debated within both houses of the U.S. Congress: the Employee Free 
Choice Act, the Secret Ballot Protection Act, and the National Right to Work Act. Between 2012 
and 2014, thirty-three states introduced “right-to-work” bills and two states enacted “right-to-
work” laws. Such laws weaken private-sector collective bargaining by prohibiting required union 
membership or dues as a condition of employment.6 Given the attention placed on union-related 
public policy by the legislatures, understanding the costs and benefits of unions, including the 
impact labor unions have on companies’ information environments, is imperative to 
understanding the full impact that proposed legislation may have.  
The legislative focus on unions seems to be a reflection of the general public’s interest in 
the costs and benefits of unions and related legislation, as demonstrated by media reporting and 
social media posts. For example, the New York Times maintains an Organized Labor Navigator 
described as “A list of resources from around the Web about organized labor as selected by 
researchers and editors of the New York Times.”7 In early 2015, union-related tweets numbered 
almost 40,000 for a 30-day period.8 The existence of Gallop public opinion polls about unions 
                                                 
6 http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx. 
7 http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/organized_labor/index.html. 
8 http://topsy.com/. As of 6:00 p.m. central time on 5/30/15, there were 9,037 tweets using 




also demonstrates the public’s interest in the debate about employee unionization. These polls 
reveal large changes in public opinion about unions and right-to-work laws over time: as of 
August 2015, 58% of Americans approve of labor unions, up from an all-time low of 48% in 
2009 and down from an all-time high of 75% in the 1950’s, and as of August 2014, 71% of 
Americans would vote for a right-to-work law, compared with 62% in July of 1957. The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics reports that overall union membership decreased from 20.1% in 1983 to 
12.5% in 2004, and more recently, to 11.1% in 2014. In the private sector, union membership 
decreased from 7.9% in 2004 to 6.6% in 2014. In the public sector, union membership decreased 
from 36.4% in 2004 to 35.7% in 2014.9 The public believes this trend will continue: according to 
a Gallop poll released in September of 2011, 55% of Americans think labor unions will become 
weaker in the future. In order to understand the potential impact of this decline, it is important to 
first understand the costs and benefits of unions.  
2.2 Information Asymmetry 
 Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that information asymmetry and agency conflicts create 
demand for financial reporting and disclosure. For example, management has incentive to hide 
information from employees if they believe that employees can and will use this information to 
extract rents (e.g., during labor negotiations by unions) as well as incentive to hide information 
from investors if management is extracting rents from the company (e.g., empire building, 
excessive compensation, and perquisites). Conversely, potential investors have incentive to 
pressure management for information disclosure in order to better understand the value of an 
investment and current investors have incentive to pressure management for information 
disclosure to help keep management from extracting rents. Healy and Palepu (2001) identify two 





main problems that impede optimal allocation of savings to investment opportunities: the 
information (“lemons”) problem and the agency problem.  
The information (“lemons”) problem summarized by Healy and Palepu (2001) occurs 
because entrepreneurs generally have better information about the value of the business 
opportunities they offer than potential investors and an incentive to claim their business 
opportunities are more valuable than other business opportunities available. If potential investors 
cannot distinguish between valuable business opportunities and the “lemons,” they will value all 
ideas at an average level, thus discounting “good” ideas and overvaluing “bad” ideas. Thus, 
management has an incentive to highlight good news and downplay bad news. This idea is 
consistent with prior literature that finds that, on average, managers delay bad news but do not 
delay good news (e.g., Kothari et al. 2009). Management may also delay or withhold bad news in 
the hope that subsequent good news occurs before information must be released (Graham et al. 
2005). However, the existence of proprietary costs of disclosure, for example the use of 
disclosed information by competitors or employees, can provide competing incentives to 
withhold good news. Verrecchia (1983) posits that disclosure costs introduce noise because 
investors are unable to interpret whether a lack of disclosure is a signal of bad news or a signal 
that the proprietary costs of disclosure outweigh the benefits of disclosing good news. Prior 
literature also finds that increased disclosure is associated with an increase in liquidity, an 
increase in information intermediation, and a decrease in cost of capital (Healy and Palepu 2001) 
and documents that managers have incentive to disclose bad news in the presence of litigation 
risk (e.g., Kasznik and Lev 1995). Taken together, prior literature suggests that, absent disclosure 




The agency problem differs from the information (“lemons”) problem, which occurs 
before investment, in that it occurs after investment when management does not act in the 
interest of shareholders or other stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Healy and Palepu 
2001). Since most investors and creditors are not active as managers of their investments, 
managers may have the opportunity to extract rents by managing the business opportunity in a 
way that benefits managers, rather than investors. In the context of a public company, the same 
incentives to delay, disclose, or not disclose information exist with the agency problem as with 
the information (“lemons”) problem. Because of career concerns (e.g., promotion, future 
employment opportunities, potential termination) and/or because compensation is tied to 
company stock market performance, management still has all the same disclosure incentives as 
with the information (“lemons”) problem to improve or maintain market performance by 
highlighting good news and withholding or delaying bad news, to obfuscate information that has 
proprietary costs of disclosure, and to limit litigation risk, decrease cost of capital and increase 
liquidity by disclosing information (Kothari et al. 2009). Management also has incentives to 
manipulate the market price for personal benefit. For example, prior literature documents that 
management withholds good news and discloses bad news prior to option grants (Aboody and 
Kasznik 2000) and purchases of stocks, presumably to decrease the exercise price (Cheng and Lo 
2006). Further, management has incentive to obfuscate information if they are extracting rents at 
the expense of shareholders (e.g., perquisites, excessive compensation, empire building) or 
creditors (e.g., taking on more senior debt, paying dividends, taking on high-risk projects, etc.) 
(e.g., Bova et al. 2015). 
Because market performance is a repeating game in that there are continuously potential 




and agency problems inherently exist simultaneously for publicly traded companies. Healy and 
Palepu (2001) note that prior literature points to the disclosure of managers’ private information 
as the solution to the information (“lemons”) and agency problems, thus reducing information 
asymmetry. They identify methods for compelling the disclosure of managers’ private 
information, including regulation requiring disclosure, the existence of optimal contracts 
between management and investors or creditors which align incentives between the parties by 
requiring disclosure of private information (e.g., compensation agreements, debt contracts, etc.), 
monitoring and disciplining of management by the board of directors, the presence of 
information intermediaries (e.g., financial analysts and rating agencies) that uncover private 
information and management misuse of company resources, and the market for corporate control 
(e.g., hostile takeover threats, proxy contests, etc.).  
2.3 Managements’ Incentives to Obfuscate Information in the Presence of Labor Unions 
Labor unions have an interest in company information that can be used during labor 
negotiations to justify higher pay, better working conditions, etc., and thus are incentivized to 
demand information from management. Management has a fiduciary responsibility to behave in 
the best interest of shareholders and thus may be incentivized to hide information that can be 
used by unions to extract rents. Management may also be incentivized to hide information when 
they act in their own interest, rather than in the interest of shareholders. If unions have power, 
they may be able to demand such information from management (e.g., by threatening a strike 
when enough employees would participate in making such a strike damaging). Consistent with 
this idea, a number of papers suggest that unions provide management with an incentive to 
obfuscate information, particularly during labor negotiations, in order to reduce unions’ 




example, using survey data from business executives, Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) find that 
employee wages and benefits increase when management discloses information about a 
company’s financial condition, productivity, future investments, and relative wages. However, 
they do not find any increase in productivity. Scott (1994) finds that when companies operate in 
an industry with higher than average wages or under the threat of a strike, management discloses 
less pension information. Frost (2000) describes decentralized (local) bargaining during four 
company restructurings and concludes that the ability to access information from management is 
a key factor for a union to obtain favorable results. Consistent with this idea, prior literature also 
documents that unionization results in more income-decreasing accounting choices and lower 
equity value (Ruback and Zimmerman 1984) and that unions generally do not have access to 
company financial information (Leap 1991).  
2.4 Labor Unions as Monitors  
Unions have a concentrated interest in demanding company information because such 
information may be used during labor negotiations to benefit employees. Consistent with this 
idea, another stream of literature suggests that unions may serve as external monitors, similar to 
institutional investors (e.g., Schwab and Thomas 1998, Chen et al. 2012, Farber et al. 2012, Chyz 
et al. 2013, Gomez and Tzioumis 2013). For example, Schwab and Thomas (1998) posit that 
unions are increasingly participating in shareholder activism, such as sponsoring resolutions to 
declassify corporate boards of directors and redeem poison pills and to seek changes in executive 
pay. Gomez and Tzioumis (2013) find that CEO total compensation and stock option 
compensation are negatively associated with unionization, suggesting that unions could be 
serving as an external monitor by curtailing excessive compensation. Chyz et al. (2013) find that 




in more unionized industries have lower bond yields, less risky investment policies, and are less 
likely to be acquisition targets. Finally, Farber et al. (2012) posit that, since shareholder demand 
for conditional accounting conservatism should increase with information asymmetry, unions 
and conditional accounting conservatism may behave as complements. They also posit that, since 
both conditional accounting conservatism and labor unions restrict risky investments, unions and 
conditional accounting conservatism may behave as substitutes. They use the Basu (1997) 
asymmetric timeliness of good and bad news measure of conservatism and find that union 
strength is associated with lower conservatism, consistent with the idea that unions may serve in 
a monitoring role and are becoming more aligned with shareholder incentives.  
2.5 Impact of Employee Ownership on Managements’ Incentives to Obfuscate 
Information 
Employee ownership may reduce managements’ incentives to obfuscate information in 
the presence of unions. Prior literature suggests that one of the driving forces behind 
managements’ incentives to obfuscate information in the presence of unions is to prevent 
employees from extracting rents during labor negotiations (Kleiner and Bouillon 1988, Scott 
1994, Frost 2000, Hilary 2006). For example, Schwab and Thomas (1998) posit that, as the role 
of unions shifts toward protecting/improving the financial performance of union retirement 
plans, which provide employees with an ownership interest in their employers, their interests 
become more aligned with maximizing shareholder value. As employees’ incentives become 
more aligned with shareholders, union incentives to extract rents for employees at the expense of 
shareholders should decrease and managements’ incentives to obfuscate information in the 
presence of unions to prevent such rent extraction by employees should decrease, which should 




Further, consistent with the agency problem summarized by Healy and Palepu (2001) 
discussed above, management has incentive to obfuscate information about management rent 
extraction (e.g., perquisites, excessive compensation, empire building). As employees’ incentives 
become more aligned with shareholders, employees should become concerned about 
management rent extraction at the expense of shareholders and unions may provide employees a 
mechanism unavailable to other shareholders to demand information to help prevent and detect 
such rent extraction, which should decrease information asymmetry. 
Consistent with this idea, prior literature suggests that employee ownership leads to more 
closely aligned incentives between employees and shareholders (e.g., Jones and Kato 1995, 
Schwab and Thomas 1998, Bova et al. 2015). However, in contrast to this idea, other findings 
suggest that shareholder value can erode when nonmanager employees have too much ownership 
(La Porta et al. 1997). Further, it must be noted that in this context, the benefits of employee 
ownership should only fully mitigate the benefits of rent extraction by employees when a 
company is 100 percent employee-owned (Bova et al. 2015). Thus, even in the presence of 
employee ownership, management may still have incentives to obfuscate information in the 
presence of unions to prevent employee rent extraction. 
2.6 Prior Literature on the Effect of Unions on Information Asymmetry 
Hilary (2006) empirically tests the association between unions and information 
asymmetry, proxied for by bid-ask-spread, probability of informed trading (PIN), and analyst 
following. He finds that companies’ unionization rates are positively associated with information 
asymmetry. He uses industry-wide unionization rates (implying interfirm homogeneity), 
multiplied by the labor intensity rate (the number of employees scaled by assets) as his measure 




Bova et al. (2015) build on prior literature and develop an analytical model predicting 
that employee ownership should reduce companies’ proprietary disclosure costs by reducing 
employee incentives to extract rents, thus increasing voluntary disclosure. They build on Hilary 
(2006) and find that the presence of a union is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure 
and then examine whether managements’ disincentives to voluntarily disclose in the presence of 
unions is mitigated by employee ownership. They find a positive association between voluntary 
disclosure by management and the probability of employee ownership in the presence of labor 
unions.10 Their results are consistent with the idea that, as employee ownership increases, unions 
may begin to serve as external monitors, similar to institutional investors, and that their 
incentives become more closely aligned with that of shareholders, thus decreasing managements’ 
incentives to obfuscate information in order to counteract rent extraction by employees. When 
combined with prior literature, their study naturally leads to the question of whether employee 
ownership impacts the effect of unions on market-based measures of information asymmetry, 
which should capture the extent to which insiders are privy to information that other market 
participants are not privy to. Thus, I extend this literature stream by examining the effect of 
employee ownership on insider trading behavior, analyst following, and analyst dispersion in the 
presence of a union. 
                                                 
10 Bova et al. (2015) use the Hilary (2006) measure of unionization as their measure, calling it 
“employee bargaining power.” This measure is calculated by multiplying industry union rates by 
the labor intensity rate, which is calculated as the number of employees scaled by assets. 
Because of the way the variable is constructed, Bova et al. posits that there is likely endogeneity 
between employee ownership and employee bargaining power. To address this issue, they use a 
two-stage approach and model the probability of employee ownership in the first stage to use in 




2.7 Hilary (2006) Unionization Measure 
 I compare Hilary’s (2006) method of identifying unionization rates to the rates implied 
by the companies’ own disclosure. For a sample of observations of all companies listed in 
Compustat for the last year in his sample (1999) in the SIC 3-digit industry code 371: Motor 
Vehicles And Motor Vehicle Equipment (Manufacturing), which has the highest unionization 
rate of any of the SIC 3-digit industries used by Hilary, I find that 22.2% of the companies 
disclose that they do not have a union. Under Hilary’s method, every company in his sample in 
this industry is assigned a 36.9% unionization rate. Thus, Hilary’s results may not accurately 
reflect the association between unions and information asymmetry. I conduct validation tests of 
Hilary’s measure by replacing my union measures with Hilary’s measure and find some results 
that differ from my findings.11  
                                                 
11 In untabulated validation tests, I re-estimate Model (1), Model (2), and Model (3) using 
Hilary’s (2006) unionization measure calculated by multiplying the industry-level unionization 
rate by the labor intensity rate. I follow Hilary’s (2006) industry classification methodology: he 
uses NAISC industry classifications based on the annual union membership report available from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. He uses industry-level data for most industry classifications, but 
breaks out the manufacturing industry by sector (using NAISC classifications). Although they 
are not separate NAISC sectors, he also reports separate unionization rates for vehicle 
manufacturing as well as airplane manufacturers. I obtain my data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and from the Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population 
Survey (see Hirsch and MacPherson 2003). These data are publically available on bls.gov and 
unionstats.com. An indicator variable for the presence of a union would have no meaning since 
there are no industries included in the data with no union rate. Likewise, an indicator variable for 
the top decile of industry union rates would only serve as a proxy for a highly unionized 
industry. Thus, I do not include either in my validation tests. I find a negative association 
between Hilary’s (2006) union measure and insider trading, which is consistent with the one case 
where I find significance in my main tests of Hypothesis 1. In contrast to my results showing a 
negative association between analyst following and the presence of a union for each of my union 
measures, I find no association between analyst following and Hilary’s (2006) union measure. I 
find a negative association between Hilary’s union measure and analyst dispersion, which is 





Prior literature provides ample support for the idea that management has incentive to 
obfuscate information in the presence of a union (e.g., Ruback and Zimmerman 1984, Kleiner 
and Bouillon 1988, Leap 1991, Scott 1994, Reynolds et al. 1998, Frost 2000, Hilary 2006). 
Conversely, prior literature also posits that unions may serve as external monitors, similar to 
institutional investors (e.g., Schwab and Thomas 1998, Chen et al. 2012, Farber et al. 2012, Chyz 
et al. 2013, Gomez and Tzioumis 2013).  
Taken together, it is unclear whether managements’ incentives to obfuscate information 
because of the agency and information (“lemons”) problems in the presence unions or the 
monitoring effect of unions will dominate. Thus, my first hypothesis, stated in the null, is as 
follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Employee unionization is not associated with information asymmetry. 
I further extend prior literature by examining whether employee ownership impacts the 
effect of labor unions on information asymmetry. Prior literature posits that, absent costs of 
disclosure, management should fully disclose information (Healy and Palepu 2001) and that 
employee ownership should increase unions’ incentive to act in the interest of shareholders 
(Bova et al. 2015). Thus, employee ownership should decrease employees’ incentive to extract 
rents from companies, as well as managements’ incentives to obfuscate information to try to 
prevent such rent extraction from employees. However, this assumption is limited by the fact that 
unless a company is 100% employee-owned, employees may still have significant incentive to 
extract rents.  
Prior literature also posits that management has incentive to hide information when their 




identify the agency problem (when management and investor incentives are not aligned) as a 
cause of information asymmetry. When employees are owners, and thus their interests are 
aligned with shareholders, management may have more incentive to obfuscate information to 
prevent self-serving behavior from being discovered.  
Taken together, it is unclear whether employee ownership will affect the effect of 
unionization on information asymmetry. Thus, my second hypotheses, stated in the null, is as 
follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Employee ownership does not impact the effect of employee unionization 
on information asymmetry. 
3. UNION DATA AND MEASURES 
3.1 Union Data 
I hand collect observations for my union variables from the disclosures in company 10-
Ks filed on EDGAR.12 To obtain the sample, I started with a database of the 10-K’s filed on 
EDGAR between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2011 that include the keyword “union” or 
the keywords “collective” and “bargain” within 3 words of each other.13 Next, I limited my 
search to fiscal year 2009 observations which have the required control and dependent variables 
for each of my main tests (See Table 1, Table 5, and Table 9). Finally, I accessed EDGAR and 
read through each 10-K remaining in the sample. I then documented whether the 10-K discloses 
the presence of a union or collective bargaining agreement as well as the percentage of 
employees subject to a union contract or collective bargaining agreement.14  
                                                 
12 http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
13 Thank you to Dr. Roy Schmardebeck for providing assistance with the keyword search. 
14 Some 10-Ks disclose the number of employees subject to unions or collective bargaining 
agreements as well as total employees, rather than the percentage of employees subject to such 




3.2 Assumption of Unionization Rate Consistency across Years 
 In order to extend my tests to include fiscal years 2008 and 2010, I assume that the 
presence of a union or collective bargaining agreement and the percentage of U.S. employees 
subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement for an individual company for fiscal year 
2008 and fiscal year 2010 are consistent with the presence of a union or collective bargaining 
agreement and the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or collective bargaining 
agreement disclosed in a company’s 2009 10-K. To validate this assumption, I collected 10 
random observations from my sample of companies that disclose information about their 
unionization rate and 10 observations for companies that disclose they do not have unions.15 I 
found no instances where companies switched between having a union and not having a union. 
Thus, the assumption that unionization stays constant provides a Union Indicator variable that is 
100% correct for the validation test sample. The mean was 2.10% (-0.16%) and the median was 
1.76% (0.06%) for the absolute value (directional value) of the difference between the 2008 and 
2009 percentages of U.S. employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement for the 
companies in the validation test sample. The mean was 1.62% (-1.27%) and the median was 
0.31% (0.01%) for the absolute value (directional value) of the difference between the 2009 and 
2010 percentages of U.S. employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement for the 
companies in the validation test sample. The maximum absolute difference between the 2008 and 
2009 unionization percentages was 5.00% while the maximum absolute difference between the 
2009 and 2010 unionization percentages was 11.83%. The company with the highest 
unionization percentage in 2009 (representing the top decile, my cutoff for the Big Union 
indicator variable) is the same company with the highest unionization percentage in both 2008 
                                                 




and 2009. Based on the validation test, I conclude that unionization rates stayed relatively 
constant between 2008, 2009, and 2010 and assign 2009 values to 2008 and 2010 at the 
company-specific level.   
3.3 Union Measures  
I use three union measures created from the union data. First, I include Union Indicator, 
an indicator variable that equals one if a company’s 10-k discloses their U.S. employees have a 
union or collective bargaining agreement, and zero otherwise. Second, I include Union Rate, a 
continuous variable which equals the percentage of a company’s U.S. employees who are 
unionized or subject to a collective bargaining agreement. I assign a percentage of zero to those 
companies that disclose in their 10-K they have no U.S. employees who are unionized or who are 
subject to a collective bargaining agreement. Finally, I include Big Union, an indicator variable 
that equals one if the percentage of U.S. employees who are unionized or subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement is in the top decile of sample observations. I calculate Big Union 
separately for each sample regression where sample sizes differ because of the variables required 
for each regression. I exclude from my sample observations for companies that do not disclose in 
their 10-K whether their U.S. employees are unionized or subject to a collective bargaining 
agreement, as well as observations for companies that disclose in their 10-K that they do have 
U.S. employees who are unionized or subject to a collective bargaining agreement but do not 




4. EMPIRICAL MODELS, DATA, AND RESULTS 
4.1 Insider Trading Models, Data, and Results 
4.1.1 Insider Trading Measure 
Information asymmetry arises when company insiders or some market participants have 
information that other market participants are not privy to. As discussed above, in the presence 
of information asymmetry, investments are improperly priced and management may be able to 
extract rents. Since the inside information that management is privy to remains private, I cannot 
directly measure what information is known to insiders but not shared with other market 
participants. Since information asymmetry cannot be directly measured, proxies for information 
asymmetry measure outcomes and behavior that arise from information asymmetry. Because 
insiders can benefit at the expense of other market participants from trading on their inside 
knowledge, insider trading measures are often used as measures of information asymmetry in 
accounting literature (e.g., Frankel and Li 2004, Hilary 2006, Huddart and Ke 2007). Piotroski 
and Roulstone (2005) find that insider trades reflect insiders’ superior knowledge about future 
cash flow realizations. Similarly, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insider trades are 
informative about future market movements and that insiders in smaller companies are able to 
predict cross-sectional stock returns. If the presence or proportion of unionized employees 
affects information asymmetry between insiders and other market participants, I would expect 
this to be reflected in insider trading behavior. I follow Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) and use 
the net purchase ratio of insider shares traded as my measure of insider trading.16 
                                                 
16 Rather than following Hilary (2006) and using the probability of informed trading (PIN), I use 
insider trading  because prior literature suggests that PIN likely captures information asymmetry 
between non-insiders while insider trading likely captures information asymmetry between 




4.1.2 Insider Trading Empirical Model 
I estimate the following model to test Hypothesis 1: 
Insider Tradingt  = α0 + α1 Union Indicatort + α2 Sizet-1 + α3 Institutional Holdingst-1  
+ α4 BTMt-1 + α5 Returnst-1 + α6 Grantst-1 + α7 ROEt + Year FE 
+ Industry FE + εt,              (1) 
  
where: 
Insider Trading  = the net purchase ratio, calculated as the number of net shares 
purchased by company insiders during the fiscal year scaled by the 
sum of the absolute value of the number shares purchased and the 
absolute value of the number of shares sold by company insiders 
during the fiscal year; 
 
Union Indicator = an indicator variable set equal to one when the company’s 10-K 
discloses the percentage of company U.S. employees who are 
unionized or subject to a collective bargaining agreement, and zero 
if a company discloses in their 10-K that employees are not 
unionized or subject to a collective bargaining agreement; 
 
Size  = the natural log of the market value of equity calculated as 
CSHO*PRCC_F (or as the natural log of MKVALT if missing 
CSHO, PRCC_F, or both); 
 
Institutional Holdings  = the percentage of shares held by institutional investors at the end 
of the fiscal year; 
 
BTM  = the book-to-market ratio calculated as CEQ/(CSHO x PRCC_F); 
 
Returns  = raw buy-and-hold stock returns during the fiscal year;  
 
Grants  = the number of stock options granted to company insiders scaled 
by the number of shares held by insiders at the beginning of the 
fiscal year; and 
 
ROE  = return on equity calculated as net income (NI) scaled by the book 
value of common equity (CEQ) at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
Union Indicator is the variable of interest in Model (1). As discussed in the background 
and hypothesis development section, I have no directional prediction for Union Indicator and 




Model (1) includes control variables from extant insider trading literature which are 
associated with insider trading. Specifically, I include the market value of equity (Size) because 
insiders at larger companies should have greater access to shares from sources other than 
purchase on the open market (e.g., incentive based compensation). This idea that insiders at 
larger companies have greater access to shares to sell without purchasing them on the open 
market is consistent with prior literature that shows that insider selling is positively related to the 
size of the company (Lakonishok and Lee 2001) and that the magnitude of insider trades is 
positively related to the size of the company (Skaife et al. 2013). I include Institutional Holdings 
because monitoring by institutional investors should curtail the ability of insiders to profit at the 
expense of other market participants. This idea is consistent with prior literature which shows 
that opportunistic trading is negatively associated with institutional holdings (Rozanov 2008). I 
include the book-to-market ratio (BTM) because insiders can profit from using their inside 
information to time sales and purchases. This is consistent with prior literature which shows that 
the magnitude of insider sales is positively related to growth (Rozeff and Zaman 1998) and that 
insiders are contrarian traders (Rozeff and Zaman 1998, Piotroski and Roulstone 2005). I include 
Returns because insiders can profit from using their inside information to know when to sell and 
buy: selling their shares after returns are high and buying shares after returns are low. This 
reasoning is consistent with prior literature that shows insiders are contrarian traders and that 
insider selling is positively related to past high stock returns (Lakonishok and Lee 2001). I 
control for stock options granted (Grants) because when managers are awarded stock-based 
compensation, they can sell shares and earn a profit without having to purchase shares on the 
open market. This is consistent with prior literature that shows that insider selling is higher when 




include return on equity (ROE) to control for the possible effect of earnings on insider trading 
(Cheng and Lo 2006). Finally, I include year and industry fixed effects to control for variation in 
insider trading over time. I estimate Model (1) using ordinary least squares regression and cluster 
standard errors by company. 
In subsequent tests, I re-estimate Model (1) after replacing Union Indicator with two 
alternative union measures. First, I replace Union Indicator with Union Rate. Union Rate is a 
continuous variable and is defined as the percentage of company U.S. employees who are 
unionized or subject to a collective bargaining agreement disclosed by a company in their 10-K. I 
assign a percentage of zero to those companies that disclose in their 10-K they have no U.S. 
employees who are unionized or who are subject to a collective bargaining agreement. As with 
Union Indicator, I have no directional prediction for Union Rate and therefore use a two-tailed 
test. 
Second, I replace Union Indicator with Big Union. Big Union is an indicator variable set 
equal to one if the percentage of U.S. employees who are unionized or subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement is greater than the top decile of observations included in the insider trading 
regression sample, and zero otherwise. I include Big Union because any impact on insider 
trading from unionization may be concentrated in those observations where a large portion of 
company U.S. employees are unionized. If the unionization rate is high, management may have 
more incentive to obfuscate information. Likewise, unions may have more power and may be 
more able to exert influence as a monitor. As with Union Indicator and Union Rate, I have no 
directional prediction for Big Union and therefore use a two-tailed test. 
I estimate the following model to test Hypothesis 2: 
 
Insider Tradingt  = β0 + β1 Union Indicatort + β2 Log Employee Ownershipt  




 + β5 Institutional Holdingst-1 + β6 BTMt-1 + β7 Returnst-1  




Log Employee Ownership = the natural log of one plus the market value of company stock 
owned by employees through ESOPs scaled by the number of 
company employees; and 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
Log Employee Ownership*Union Indicator is the variable of interest and is the 
interaction between Union Indicator and Log Employee Ownership. It measures how the 
association between employee unionization and insider trading varies with employee ownership. 
I have no directional prediction for the interaction because I expect that managements’ incentives 
to obfuscate information in the presence of unions will be decreasing in employee ownership as 
employees’ incentives become more aligned with shareholders and the risk of employee rent 
extraction at the expense of shareholders decreases. Further, I expect that employee ownership 
will increase the demand for information because of the agency problem and that the presence of 
a union should provide additional power for employee owners to demand such information (e.g., 
by threat of strike or other employee action). Conversely, I expect that if management is 
extracting rents through self-serving behavior at the expense of shareholders (identified as the 
agency problem in Healy and Palepu (2001)), they will have increased incentive to hide such rent 
extraction from investors, including employee owners. Thus, I can make no directional 
prediction about the interaction.  
As with Model (1), I re-estimate Model (2) after replacing Union Indicator with two 
alternative measures, first with Union Rate, and then with Big Union. I also re-estimate Model 
(2) after replacing Log Employee Ownership with two alternative measures. First, I replace Log 




indicator variable set equal to one if employees own any company stock through ESOPs, and 
zero otherwise. Second, I replace Log Employee Ownership with Big Employee Ownership. Big 
Employee Ownership is an indicator variable set equal to one if the market value of company 
stock owned by employees through ESOPs scaled by the number of company employees is 
greater than the top decile of observations included in the insider trading regression sample, and 
zero otherwise.  
4.1.3 Insider Trading Data 
 My data is comprised of observations from fiscal years 2008 through 2010.  
I obtain financial data from Compustat (Fundamentals Annual). I obtain insider trading, 
institutional holding, and employee option grant data from Thomson Reuters. I obtain returns 
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I obtain data on company 
ownership by employees via ESOPs from the Form 5500 Datasets maintained by the U.S. 
Department of Labor.17 I exclude observations missing data necessary to form variables included 
in my models and observations with a price less than one dollar. My final sample consists of 
1,629 company-year observations. Prior to excluding observations missing data necessary to 
form variables included in my insider trading regressions, I winsorize all continuous independent 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of extreme observations. Table 1 
provides details about my sample selection process and Appendix A provides variable 
definitions.  
[Insert Table 1] 





4.1.4 Insider Trading Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the insider trading sample observations. The 
mean of the net purchase ratio of insider shares traded (Insider Trading) is negative, consistent 
with prior research showing insiders are net sellers, primarily because of stock-based 
compensation (e.g., Frankel and Li 2004). Approximately 24 percent of insider trading sample 
observation companies that disclose information about their U.S. employee unionization rate in 
their 10-K report they have a U.S. unionized workforce (Union Indicator=1). The mean market 
value of equity for insider trading sample observation companies is approximately $526 million, 
compared to approximately $179 million for U.S. companies on Compustat for the same period. 
The insider trading sample likely consists of larger companies on average than Compustat 
because I exclude from the sample company observations with a price less than one dollar and 
because smaller companies are more likely to be missing data necessary to form variables 
included in my models. The mean institutional holdings are approximately 62 percent for insider 
trading sample observation companies and approximately 99 percent of insider trading sample 
observations had institutional holdings. Institutional ownership in almost all observations is 
consistent with the fact that the sample includes larger companies than the Compustat universe, 
on average. The mean book-to-market ratio is approximately 75 percent. Returns range from 
approximately negative 93 percent to more than 550 percent, with a mean of 14 percent and a 
median of negative three percent.  The number of stock options granted to company insiders as a 
percentage of shares held at the beginning of the year by company insiders varies widely, with a 
mean of approximately 220 percent and a median of 35 percent, which is not surprising given the 
wide variety of stock compensation plans and investment behaviors by individual insiders. 




approximately seven percent. Approximately 25 percent of insider trading sample observation 
companies had employees whose ESOP plan owned company stock (Employee Ownership 
Indicator=1).  
[Insert Table 2] 
4.1.5 Tests of Hypothesis 1 with Insider Trading 
In Table 3, I present the results from estimating Model (1) to test Hypothesis 1 using 
insider trading as my measure of information asymmetry. In Column (1), I use an indicator 
variable for companies that disclose the presence of a U.S. union as my measure of unionized 
employees. In Column (2), I use the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or 
collective bargaining agreement as my measure of unionized employees. In Column (3), I use an 
indicator variable for the top decile of insider trading sample observations of the percentage of 
U.S. employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement as my measure of 
unionized employees.  
[Insert Table 3] 
In Column (2) and Column (3), the coefficient for unionized employees is not significant. 
This suggests that neither the percentage of unionization nor a highly a unionized workforce 
impact company information asymmetry.18 
In Column (1), the coefficient for the presence of a union is positive and significant 
(p<0.05). This suggests that insiders alter their insider trading behavior in the presence of a 
                                                 
18 It is also possible that the opposite effects on information asymmetry of managements’ 
incentives to obfuscate information in the presence of unionization versus union monitoring and 
power to demand information may cancel each other out. Since these competing effects cannot 
be observed with available data, the results provide inconclusive evidence about the effect of 
unions on information asymmetry. Future research may attempt to address this question through 




union, consistent with higher information asymmetry. Although I would expect this result to be 
concentrated in companies with larger unions, the results from Column (2) and Column (3) 
provide no such evidence.  
The coefficients on Institutional Holdings, Returns, and Grants are not significant for any 
of the three model specifications. Consistent with expectations, the coefficients on Size and ROE 
are negative and significant, while the coefficient on BTM is positive and significant in all three 
columns. 
4.1.6 Tests of Hypothesis 2 with Insider Trading 
In Table 4, I present the results from estimating Model (2) to test Hypothesis 2 using 
insider trading as my measure of information asymmetry. As in Table 3, I present results for 
three measures of unionized employees. In Column (1), Column (2) and Column (4), I use an 
indicator variable for companies that disclose the presence of a U.S. union as my measure of 
unionized employees. In Column (3) and Column (5), I use the percentage of U.S. employees 
subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement as my measure of unionized employees. In 
Column (6), I use an indicator variable for the top decile of insider trading sample observations 
of the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement as my 
measure of unionized employees. In Column (1) I use the log of the percentage of employee 
ownership as my measure of employee ownership. In Column (2) and Column (3), I use an 
indicator variable for companies with employee ownership as my measure of employee 
ownership. In Column (4), Column (5), and Column (6), I use an indictor variable for the top 
decile of insider trading sample observations of the percentage of employee ownership as my 
measure of employee ownership. 




 In all six columns, the coefficients on the interactions between the employee unionization 
measures and employee ownership measures are not significant. This result suggests that 
employee ownership does not affect the effect of unionization on information asymmetry. 
As with Model (1), the coefficients on Institutional Holdings, Returns, and Grants are not 
significant for any of the six model specifications, while, consistent with expectations, the 
coefficients on Size and ROE are negative and significant and the coefficient on BTM is positive 
and significant in all six columns. 
4.2 Analyst Following Models, Data, and Results 
4.2.1 Analyst Following Measure 
Analyst following is another measure used in accounting literature as a proxy for 
information asymmetry (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996, Francis et. al. 1997, Hilary 2006). 
Theoretically, information asymmetry should increase analyst coverage because of a greater 
demand for information by market participants and at the same time decrease analyst coverage 
because of a higher cost for analysts to obtain such information. However, prior literature has 
consistently found that that the supply side is more important and that analyst following 
increases with corporate disclosure (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996, Francis et al. 1997, Healy et 
al. 1999). Thus, I include analyst following as my second measure of information asymmetry, 
where higher analyst following suggests lower information asymmetry.  
4.2.2 Analyst Following Empirical Model 
I use analyst following as a second measure of information asymmetry and estimate the 
following model to test Hypothesis 1: 
Analyst Followingt  = δ0 + δ1 Union Indicatort + δ2 Sizet-1  
 + δ3 Institutional Holdingst-1 + δ4 BTMt-1 + δ5 Segmentst-1  
 + δ6 Foreign Segmentst-1 + δ7 Return Volatilityt-1  








Analyst Following  = the natural log of one plus the number of analysts forecasting in 
the final one-year-ahead forecast for the fiscal year; 
  
Segments  = the natural log of the number of business segments; 
 
Foreign Segments  = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company has foreign 
segments, and zero otherwise; 
 
Return Volatility  = the standard deviation of daily stock returns for the fiscal year; 
 
Spread  = the yearly median of the 12 monthly median spreads;19 
 
Leverage  = long-term debt (DLTT) plus short-term debt (DLC) divided by 
total assets (AT);  
 
ROA  = return on assets calculated as net income (NI) scaled by total 
assets (AT) at the beginning of the fiscal year; and 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
Union Indicator is the variable of interest in Model (3). As with Model (1), I have no 
directional prediction for Union Indicator and therefore use a two-tailed test. Model (3) includes 
control variables from extant analyst following literature which are associated with analyst 
following. Specifically, I include the market value of equity (Size) because larger companies may 
have more complex operations and may increase demand for investment advice. This is 
consistent with prior literature which finds that analyst following is positively related to 
company size (e.g., Bhushan 1989, O’Brien and Bhushan 1990, Brennan and Hughes 1991, Lang 
and Lundholm 1993, Barth et al. 2001, Hilary 2006, Lehavy et al. 2011). I include Institutional 
                                                 
19 I modify the measure from Corwin and Schultz (2012) by calculating median monthly spreads, 
rather than mean monthly spreads, and then calculate yearly median spreads to follow Hilary 
(2006). Hilary uses the median spread to capture the “steady state” and to mitigate the impact of 
special events and outliers. My results are unaffected by whether I use the mean or the median 




Holdings because the monitoring provided by institutional investors should improve a 
company’s information environment and it should be less costly for analysts to follow companies 
with better information environments. This is consistent with prior literature which shows that 
analyst following is positively associated with institutional holdings and that institutional 
holdings are positively associated with a company’s information environment (e.g., Bhushan 
1989, Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995, Lang and Lundholm 1996, Frankel et al. 2006, Lehavy 
et al., 2011), and suggests that information asymmetry should decrease with outside monitoring 
(Hilary 2006). I include the book-to-market ratio (BTM) because prior literature shows that 
analyst following is positively related to growth (e.g., Barth et al. 2001, Lehavey et al. 2011). 
Lehavey et al. (2011) posit that this association is likely caused by investors interested in high-
growth companies creating demand for investment advice, attracting analyst following. I include 
Segments and Foreign Segments to control for the underlying complexity of a company because 
information asymmetry should increase with complexity (e.g., Hilary 2006, Lehavy et al. 2011). 
I control for Return Volatility because prior literature shows that private information about a 
company is more valuable for companies with higher risk (e.g., higher return volatility) which 
increases demand for investment advice, attracting analyst following. I follow Hilary (2006) and 
include Spread because prior literature shows that bid-ask-spread is higher when there is less 
information available to market participants. When there is less information available, 
information is more costly for analysts to obtain and analyst following should decrease. I control 
for Leverage because prior literature shows a negative association between the debt ratio and 
analyst following (Hilary 2006). In addition, I include return on assets (ROA) to control for the 




industry fixed effects to control for variation in analyst following over time. I estimate Model (3) 
using ordinary least squares regression and cluster standard errors by company. 
As with the insider trading sample, I re-estimate Model (3) after replacing Union 
Indicator with two alternative measures, first with Union Rate, and then with Big Union in 
subsequent tests. I have no directional prediction for Union Rate and Big Union and therefore use 
two-tailed tests. 
I estimate the following model to test Hypothesis 2: 
 
Analyst Followingt  = λ0 + λ1 Union Indicatort + λ2 Log Employee Ownershipt  
 + λ3 Log Employee Ownershipt*Union Indicatort + λ4 Sizet-1  
 + λ5 Institutional Holdingst-1 + λ6 BTMt-1 + λ7 Segmentst-1  
 + λ8 Foreign Segmentst-1 + λ9 Return Volatilityt-1  
 + λ10 Spreadt + λ11 Leveraget  + λ12 ROAt-1 + Year FE 
 + Industry FE + εt,             (4) 
 
where all variables are as previously defined. 
The interaction Log Employee Ownership*Union Indicator is the variable of interest and 
measures how the association between employee unionization and analyst following varies with 
employee ownership. As discussed above, I have no directional prediction for Log Employee 
Ownership*Union Indicator and therefore use a two-tailed test.  
As before, I re-estimate Model (4) after replacing Union Indicator with two alternative 
measures, first with Union Rate, and then with Big Union in subsequent tests. I also re-estimate 
Model (4) after replacing Log Employee Ownership with two alternative measures in subsequent 
tests, first with Employee Ownership Indicator and then with Big Employee Ownership.  
4.2.3 Analyst Following Data 
 My data is comprised of observations from fiscal years 2008 through 2010. I obtain 
financial data from Compustat (Fundamentals Annual). I obtain institutional holding data from 




Security Prices (CRSP). I obtain analyst data from IBES. I obtain data on company ownership by 
employees via ESOPs from the Form 5500 Datasets maintained by the United States Department 
of Labor.20 I exclude observations missing data necessary to form variables included in my 
models and observations with a price less than one dollar. My final sample consists of 4,147 
company-year observations. Prior to excluding observations missing data necessary to form 
variables included in my analyst following regression, I winsorize all continuous independent 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of extreme observations. Table 5 
provides details about my sample selection process and Appendix A provides variable 
definitions.  
[Insert Table 5] 
4.2.4 Analyst Following Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the analyst following sample observations. The 
mean number of analysts following sample observation companies is approximately 3.3, while 
the median is 4. Approximately 81 percent of sample observation companies are followed by 
analysts. Approximately 23 percent of analyst following sample observation companies that 
disclose information about their U.S. employee unionization rate in their 10-K report they have a 
U.S. unionized workforce (Union Indicator=1). The mean market value of equity for analyst 
following sample observation companies is approximately $351 million, compared to 
approximately $179 million for U.S. companies on Compustat for the same period. Like with the 
insider trading sample, the analyst following sample likely consists of larger companies on 
average than Compustat because I exclude observations with a price of less than one dollar and 
because of data requirements to form the variables used in my models. The mean institutional 





holdings are approximately 55 percent for analyst following sample observation companies and 
approximately 96 percent of analyst following sample observations had institutional holdings. As 
with the insider trading sample, almost universal institutional ownership for sample observations 
is consistent with the fact that the analyst following sample includes larger companies than the 
Compustat universe, on average. The mean book-to-market ratio is approximately 83 percent. 
The average number of business segments is approximately 3.6 and approximately 43 percent of 
analyst following observation companies have foreign segments. The mean leverage for analyst 
following sample observation companies is approximately 18 percent. Return on assets is 
approximately negative 0.5 percent on average, with a median of approximately 1.7 percent. 
Approximately 22 percent of analyst following sample observation companies had employees 
whose ESOP plan owned company stock (Employee Ownership Indicator=1).  
[Insert Table 6] 
4.2.5 Tests of Hypothesis 1 with Analyst Following 
In Table 7, I present the results from estimating Model (3) to test Hypothesis 1 using 
analyst following as my measure of information asymmetry. As before, in Column (1), I use an 
indicator variable for companies that disclose a union as my measure of unionized employees. In 
Column (2), I use the rate of unionization as my measure of unionized employees. In Column 
(3), I use an indicator variable for the top decile of the rate of unionization for analyst following 
sample observations as my measure of unionized employees.  
[Insert Table 7] 
The union coefficient is negative and significant in Column (1), Column (2), and Column 




incentives to obfuscate information in the presence of unions, with the rate of unionization, and 
with high unionization results in increased information asymmetry.  
The coefficients on BTM, Foreign Segments, and Spread, are not significant for any of 
the three model specifications. Consistent with expectations, the coefficients on Size, 
Institutional Holdings, and Return Volatility are positive and significant, while the coefficients 
on Segments, Leverage, and ROA are negative and significant in all three cases. 
4.2.6 Tests of Hypothesis 2 with Analyst Following 
In Table 8, I present the results from estimating Model (4) to test Hypothesis 2 using 
analyst following as my dependent measure of information asymmetry. As before, in Column 
(1), Column (2) and Column (4), I use an indicator variable for companies that disclose the 
presence of a U.S. union as my measure of unionized employees. In Column (3) and Column (5), 
I use the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement as 
my measure of unionized employees. In Column (6), I use an indicator variable for the top decile 
of insider trading sample observations of the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or 
collective bargaining agreement as my measure of unionized employees. In Column (1) I use the 
log of the percentage of employee ownership as my measure of employee ownership. In Column 
(2) and Column (3), I use an indicator variable for companies with employee ownership as my 
measure of employee ownership. In Column (4), Column (5), and Column (6), I use an indictor 
variable for the top decile of insider trading sample observations of the percentage of employee 
ownership as my measure of employee ownership. 
 [Insert Table 8] 
In Column (1), Column (2), and Column (3), the coefficients on the interactions between 




result suggests that employee ownership does not affect the effect of unionization rate or union 
presence on information asymmetry. 
In Column (4), Column (5), and Column (6), the coefficient on the interaction between 
all three unionization measures and high employee ownership is positive and significant (p<0.05, 
p<0.05,  and p<0.10, respectively). These results suggest that the negative association between 
employee unionization and analyst following is mitigated for companies with high employee 
ownership. This is consistent with the idea that managements’ incentives to obfuscate 
information in the presence of unionization may be at least partially mitigated by a shift toward 
shareholder incentives by employees and that unionization may provide a mechanism for 
employees to demand information not otherwise available to employee owners. 
As with Model (3), the coefficients on BTM, Foreign Segments, and Spread are not 
significant for any of the six model specifications, while, consistent with expectations, the 
coefficients on Segments, Leverage, and ROA are negative and significant and the coefficients on 
Size, Institutional Holdings, and Return Volatility are positive and significant in all six columns.  
4.3 Analyst Dispersion Models, Data, and Results 
4.3.1 Analyst Dispersion Measure 
Another measure of information asymmetry used in prior literature is analyst dispersion 
(e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996, Lehavy et al. 2011). Analysts derive their estimates and 
recommendations from company information available to them. Analyst dispersion is greater 
when analysts provide less congruent forecasts for a company. Disagreement among analysts’ 
forecasts is a function of both differences in forecast models and differences in analysts’ 
interpretation of available information. There should be less disagreement in the interpretation of 




consistent with prior literature. For example, Lehavy et al. (2011) find a negative association 
between analyst dispersion and 10-K readability.  Lang and Lundholm (1996) find a negative 
association between corporate disclosure and analyst dispersion. Byard et al (2006) identifies 
analyst dispersion as a measure of forecast difficulty. Thus, I include analyst following as my 
final measure of information asymmetry.  
4.3.2 Analyst Dispersion Empirical Model 
I use analyst dispersion as a third measure of information asymmetry and estimate the 
following model to test Hypothesis 1: 
Analyst Dispersiont  = γ0 + γ1 Union Indicatort + γ2 Sizet-1  
 + γ3 Institutional Holdingst-1 + γ4 BTMt-1 + γ5 Segmentst-1  
 + γ6 Foreign Segmentst-1 + γ7 Return Volatilityt-1  
 + γ8 Analyst Followingt + γ9 Advertisingt-1 + γ10 R&Dt-1  




Analyst Dispersion = the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in the final one-year-
ahead forecast for the fiscal year scaled by the mean of analyst 
forecasts in the final one-year-ahead forecast for the fiscal year; 
 
Advertising = advertising expense (XAD) scaled by lagged total assets (AT); 
 
R&D = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company has research 
and development expenses for the year (XRD), and zero otherwise; 
and 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
Union Indicator is the variable of interest in Model (5). As before, I have no directional 
prediction for Union Indicator and therefore use a two-tailed test. Model (5) includes control 
variables from extant analyst literature which are associated with analyst dispersion. Specifically, 
I include the market value of equity (Size) because larger companies are likely to have better 




negatively related to company size (Lehavy et al. 2011). I include Institutional Holdings because 
companies benefiting from monitoring provided by institutional investors should have better 
information environments. This is consistent with prior literature which shows that analyst 
dispersion is negatively associated with institutional holdings and that institutional holdings is 
positively associated with a company’s information environment (Lehavy et al. 2011). I include 
measures of business complexity (Segments and Foreign Segments) because it should be 
inherently more difficult to forecast for more complex companies which should lead to greater 
disagreement among analysts. This is consistent with prior literature which finds that analyst 
dispersion is positively associated with segments (Lehavy et al. 2011). I control for risk (Return 
Volatility) because companies with high risk should be harder to forecast, increasing 
disagreement among analysts. This is consistent with prior literature which shows that analyst 
dispersion is higher for companies with higher return volatility (Lehavy et al. 2011). I control for 
Analyst Following because dispersion is at least partially a function of the number of analysts 
following a company and to control for the richness of a company’s information environment 
because companies with more informative disclosures have higher analyst following (Lang and 
Lundholm 1996, Lehavy et al. 2011). I include R&D and Advertising because intangible 
investment should make forecasting more difficult, resulting in greater disagreement among 
analysts. This is consistent with prior literature which finds a positive association between 
analyst dispersion and intangible investment (Barth et al. 2001, Lehavy et al. 2011). In addition, I 
include the book-to-market ratio (BTM) because growth should make forecasting more difficult 
creating disagreement among analysts. This is consistent with prior literature which finds a 
positive association between analyst dispersion and earnings growth (Lehavy et al. 2011). 




over time. I estimate Model (5) using ordinary least squares regression and cluster standard 
errors by company. 
As before, I re-estimate Model (5) after replacing Union Indicator with two alternative 
measures, first with Union Rate, and then with Big Union in subsequent tests. I have no 
directional prediction for Union Rate and Big Union and therefore use a two-tailed test 
I estimate the following model to test Hypothesis 2: 
 
Analyst Dispersiont  = ζ0 + ζ1 Union Indicatort + ζ2 Log Employee Ownershipt  
 + ζ3 Log Employee Ownershipt*Union Indicatort + ζ4 Sizet-1  
 +  ζ5 Institutional Holdingst-1 + ζ6 BTMt-1 + ζ7 Segmentst-1  
 + ζ8 Foreign Segmentst-1 + ζ9 Return Volatilityt-1  
 + ζ10 Analyst Followingt + ζ11 Advertisingt-1 + ζ12 R&Dt-1  
 + Year FE + Industry FE  + εt,        (6) 
 
where all variables are as previously defined. 
Log Employee Ownership*Union Indicator is the variable of interest and measures how 
the association between employee unionization and analyst dispersion varies with employee 
ownership. As before, I have no directional prediction for Log Employee Ownership*Union 
Indicator and therefore use a two-tailed test.  
As before, I re-estimate Model (6) after replacing Union Indicator with two alternative 
measures, first with Union Rate, and then with Big Union in subsequent tests. I also re-estimate 
Model (4) after replacing Log Employee Ownership with two alternative measures in subsequent 
tests, first with Employee Ownership Indicator and then with Big Employee Ownership.  
4.3.3 Analyst Dispersion Data 
My analyst dispersion data is comprised of observations from fiscal years 2008 through 
2010. I obtain financial data from Compustat (Fundamentals Annual). I obtain institutional 
holding data from Thomson Reuters. I obtain returns data from the Center for Research in 




employees via ESOPs from the Form 5500 Datasets maintained by the United States Department 
of Labor.21 I exclude observations missing data necessary to form variables included in my 
models and observations with a price less than one dollar. My final sample consists of 2,985 
company observations. Prior to excluding observations missing data necessary to form variables 
included in my analyst dispersion regressions, I winsorize all continuous independent variables 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of extreme observations. Table 9 provides 
details about my sample selection process and Appendix A provides variable definitions. 
[Insert Table 9] 
4.3.4 Analyst Dispersion Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 10 presents descriptive statistics for the analyst dispersion sample observations. 
Analyst Dispersion has a mean of approximately 1.6 percent while the median is approximately 
0.6 percent. As is required to calculate dispersion, 100 percent of analyst following sample 
observation companies have at least two analysts following them. Approximately 27 percent of 
analyst dispersion sample observation companies that disclose information about their U.S. 
employee unionization rate in their 10-K report they have a U.S. unionized workforce (Union 
Indicator=1). The mean market value of equity for analyst dispersion sample observation 
companies is approximately $718 million. This is consistent with the idea that the analyst 
dispersion following sample is likely to consist of larger companies on average because inclusion 
in the sample requires companies to be followed by at least two analysts. The mean institutional 
holdings are approximately 68 percent for analyst dispersion sample observation companies and 
approximately 99.6 percent of analyst dispersion sample observations had institutional holdings. 
As before, almost universal institutional ownership for sample observations is consistent with the 





fact that the sample includes larger companies than the Compustat universe, on average. The 
mean book-to-market ratio is approximately 70 percent. The average number of business 
segments is approximately 4 and approximately 45 percent of analyst dispersion observation 
companies have foreign segments. Return volatility has an average of approximately 3.8 percent. 
The mean number of analysts following companies in the analyst dispersion sample is 
approximately 6.4. The mean advertising expense as a percentage of lagged assets is 
approximately 0.8 percent. Approximately 51 percent of analyst dispersion sample observation 
companies have research and development expense. Approximately 25 percent of analyst 
dispersion sample observation companies had employees whose ESOP plan owned company 
stock (Employee Ownership Indicator=1). 
[Insert Table 10] 
4.3.5 Tests of Hypothesis 1 with Analyst Dispersion 
In Table 11, I present the results from estimating Model (5) to test Hypothesis 1 using 
analyst dispersion as my measure of information asymmetry. As before, in Column (1), I use an 
indicator variable for companies that disclose a union as my measure of unionized employees. In 
Column (2), I use the rate of unionization as my measure of unionized employees. In Column 
(3), I use an indicator variable for the top decile of the rate of unionization for analyst dispersion 
trading sample observations as my measure of unionized employees.  
[Insert Table 11] 
 In Column (2) and Column (3), the coefficient for unionized employees is not significant. 
This suggests that neither the percentage of a union nor a highly unionized workforce impact 




In Column (1), the union coefficient is negative and significant (p<0.05). Taken together 
with Table 7, this suggests that, although fewer analysts follow companies with unions, those 
that do provide collectively more congruent forecasts for companies with unions than for 
companies without unions. These results are mixed and, when compared to the analyst following 
results, provide contradictory evidence about the effect of employee unionization on information 
asymmetry. 
The coefficients on Size, Segments, Foreign Segments, Analyst Following, Advertising, 
and R&D are not significant for any of the three model specifications. Consistent with 
expectations, the coeffecient on Institutional Holdings is negative and significant, while the 
coefficients on BTM and Return Volatility are positive and significant in all three cases. 
4.3.6 Tests of Hypothesis 2 with Analyst Dispersion 
In Table 12, I present the results from estimating Model (6) to test Hypothesis 2 using 
analyst dispersion as my dependent measure of information asymmetry. As before, in Column 
(1), Column (2) and Column (4), I use an indicator variable for companies that disclose the 
presence of a U.S. union as my measure of unionized employees. In Column (3) and Column (5), 
I use the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement as 
my measure of unionized employees. In Column (6), I use an indicator variable for the top decile 
of insider trading sample observations of the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or 
collective bargaining agreement as my measure of unionized employees. In Column (1) I use the 
log of the percentage of employee ownership as my measure of employee ownership. In Column 
(2) and Column (3), I use an indicator variable for companies with employee ownership as my 




variable for the top decile of insider trading sample observations of the percentage of employee 
ownership as my measure of employee ownership.  
[Insert Table 12] 
In Column (3), the coefficient on the interaction between the union rate variable and the 
employee ownership indicator is negative and significant (p<0.10). This results suggest that the 
association between the employee unionization rate and analyst dispersion is lower for 
companies with employee ownership than for companies with no employee ownership. This 
result is consistent with the idea that employee ownership decreases information asymmetry in 
the presence of unionization. However, in Column (1), Column (2), Column (4), Column (5) and 
Column (6), the coefficients on the interactions between the employee unionization measures 
and employee ownership measures are not significant. Overall, these results suggest that 
employee ownership does not affect the effect of unionization rate or union presence on 
information asymmetry. 
As with Model (5), the coefficients Size, Segments, Foreign Segments, Analyst 
Following, Advertising, and R&D are not significant for any of the three model specifications, 
while, consistent with expectations, the coefficient on Institutional Holdings is negative and 
significant and the coefficients on BTM and Return Volatility are positive and significant in all 
six columns. 
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
5.1 Controlling for Corporate Governance in Insider Trading Models 
 Effective governance should curtail the ability of insiders to profit from trading on insider 
information, thus decreasing incentive for insiders to trade. Consistent with this idea, prior 




characteristics, such as board size and independence (e.g., Rozanov 2008). To control for the 
potential effect of governance on my insider trading regressions, I re-examine Model (1) and 
Model (2) and include the governance measures Top Ownership, Board Size, and Outside 
Directors as follows: 
Insider Tradingt  = α0 + α1 Union Indicatort + α2 Sizet-1 + α3 Institutional Holdingst-1  
+ α4 BTMt-1 + α5 Returnst-1 + α6 Grantst-1 + α7 ROEt  
+ α8 Top Ownershipt + α9 Board Sizet-1 + α10 Outside Directorst-1  
+ Year FE + Industry FE + εt,            (7) 
 
Insider Tradingt  = β0 + β1 Union Indicatort + β2 Log Employee Ownershipt  
 + β3 Log Employee Ownershipt*Union Indicatort + β4 Sizet-1  
 + β5 Institutional Holdingst-1 + β6 BTMt-1 + β7 Returnst-1  
 + β8 Grantst-1 + β9 ROEt + β10 Top Ownershipt + β11 Board Sizet-1  
+ β12 Outside Directorst-1 + Year FE + Industry FE + εt,         (8) 
where: 
Top Ownership  = the percentage of common shares owned by the company’s top 
managers and directors, as defined by MSCI GMI Ratings; 
 
Board Size  = the total number of board members; and 
 
Outside Directors  = the number of company directors who are independent, as 
defined by MSCI GMI Ratings. 
 
All other variables are as previously defined.  
 As with Model (1), Union Indicator is the variable of interest in Model (7). As before, I 
have no directional prediction for Union Indicator and therefore use a two-tailed test.  As with 
Model (2), Log Employee Ownership*Union Indicator is the variable of interest in Model (8). As 
before, I have no directional prediction for Log Employee Ownership*Union Indicator and 
therefore use a two-tailed test. I obtain governance data from MSCI GMI Ratings. After 
removing observations from my original insider trading regression sample without governance 
data required for my governance variables, my sample consists of 1,179 company-year 




two alternative measures, first with Union Rate, and then with Big Union. As with Model (2), I 
re-estimate Model (8) after replacing Union Indicator with two alternative measures, first with 
Union Rate, and then with Big Union, and after replacing Log Employee Ownership with two 
alternative measures, first with Employee Ownership Indicator and then with Big Employee 
Ownership.  
I present the results from re-estimating Model (1) while controlling for governance in 
Table 13. In Column (1), I use an indicator variable for companies that disclose the presence of a 
U.S. union as my measure of unionized employees. In Column (2), I use the percentage of U.S. 
employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement as my measure of unionized 
employees. In Column (3), I use an indicator variable for the top decile of insider trading sample 
observations of the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or collective bargaining 
agreement as my measure of unionized employees.  
[Insert Table 13] 
As with my results in Table (3) for Model (1), the coefficient for unionized employees is 
not significant in Column (2) or Column (3), and unlike the results in Table (3), the coefficient 
on the union indicator is not significant in Column (1). This suggests that neither the percentage 
of unionization, nor the rate of unionization, nor a highly a unionized workforce impact company 
information asymmetry. 
I present the results from re-estimating Model (2) while controlling for governance in 
Table 14. In Column (1), Column (2) and Column (4), I use an indicator variable for companies 
that disclose the presence of a U.S. union as my measure of unionized employees. In Column (3) 
and Column (5), I use the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or collective 




variable for the top decile of insider trading sample observations of the percentage of U.S. 
employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement as my measure of unionized 
employees. In Column (1) I use the log of the percentage of employee ownership as my measure 
of employee ownership. In Column (2) and Column (3), I use an indicator variable for 
companies with employee ownership as my measure of employee ownership. In Column (4), 
Column (5), and Column (6), I use an indictor variable for the top decile of insider trading 
sample observations of the percentage of employee ownership as my measure of employee 
ownership.  
 [Insert Table 14] 
 As with my results in Table (4) for Model (2), the coefficients on the interactions 
between my measures of unionized employees and my measures of employee ownership are not 
significant for any of the six model specifications. This result suggests that employee ownership 
does not affect the effect of unionization on information asymmetry. 
5.2 Controlling for Corporate Governance in Analyst Following Models 
 Prior literature documents a positive association between managerial ownership and 
corporate disclosure (Eng and Mak 2003). Consistent with this idea, Hilary (2006) posits that 
managers’ personal incentives may impact the level of information asymmetry and that 
management ownership may incentivize management to reduce the cost of capital and decrease 
information asymmetry (Hilary 2006). Prior literature also finds that corporate board 
characteristics are associated with corporate disclosure (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005, Karamanou and 
Vafeas 2005). Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that analyst following is higher for companies 




analyst following regressions, I re-examine Model (3) and Model (4) and include the governance 
measures Top Ownership, Board Size, and Outside Directors as follows: 
Analyst Followingt  = δ0 + δ1 Union Indicatort + δ2 Sizet-1 + δ3 Institutional Holdingst-1  
 + δ4 BTMt-1 + δ5 Segmentst-1 + δ6 Foreign Segmentst-1    
 + δ7 Return Volatilityt-1 + δ8 Spreadt + δ9 Leveraget + δ10 ROAt-1  
 + δ11 Top Ownershipt + δ12 Board Sizet-1   
 + δ13 Outside Directorst-1 + Year FE + Industry FE + εt,         (9) 
 
Analyst Followingt  = λ0 + λ1 Union Indicatort + λ2 Log Employee Ownershipt  
 + λ3 Log Employee Ownershipt*Union Indicatort + λ4 Sizet-1  
 + λ5 Institutional Holdingst-1 + λ6 BTMt-1 + λ7 Segmentst-1  
 + λ8 Foreign Segmentst-1 + λ9 Return Volatilityt-1 + λ10 Spreadt  
 + λ11 Leveraget + λ12 ROAt-1 + λ13 Top Ownershipt  
 + λ14 Board Sizet-1 + λ15 Outside Directorst-1 + Year FE 
 + Industry FE + εt,                       (10) 
 
All variables are as previously defined.  
 As with Model (3), Union Indicator is the variable of interest in Model (9).  As before, I 
have no directional prediction for Union Indicator and therefore use a two-tailed test. As with 
Model (4), Log Employee Ownership*Union Indicator is the variable of interest in Model (10). 
As before, I have no directional prediction for Log Employee Ownership*Union Indicator and 
therefore use a two-tailed test.  I obtain governance data from MSCI GMI Ratings. After 
removing observations from my original analyst following regression sample without 
governance data required for my governance variables, my sample consists of 2,473 company-
year observations. As with Model (3), I re-estimate Model (9) after replacing Union Indicator 
with two alternative measures, first with Union Rate, and then with Big Union. As with Model 
(4), I re-estimate Model (10) after replacing Union Indicator with two alternative measures, first 
with Union Rate, and then with Big Union, and after replacing Log Employee Ownership with 





I present the results from re-estimating Model (3) while controlling for governance in 
Table 15. In Column (1), I use an indicator variable for companies that disclose the presence of a 
U.S. union as my measure of unionized employees. In Column (2), I use the percentage of U.S. 
employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement as my measure of unionized 
employees. In Column (3), I use an indicator variable for the top decile of insider trading sample 
observations of the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or collective bargaining 
agreement as my measure of unionized employees.  
[Insert Table 15] 
The union coefficient is negative and significant in Column (1), Column (2), and Column 
(3) (p<0.01 in all three cases). This result provides support to my previous interpretation of Table 
(7) that managements’ incentives to obfuscate information in the presence of unionization results 
in increased information asymmetry.  
I present the results from re-estimating Model (4) while controlling for governance in 
Table 16. As before, in Column (1), Column (2) and Column (4), I use an indicator variable for 
companies that disclose the presence of a U.S. union as my measure of unionized employees. In 
Column (3) and Column (5), I use the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or 
collective bargaining agreement as my measure of unionized employees. In Column (6), I use an 
indicator variable for the top decile of insider trading sample observations of the percentage of 
U.S. employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement as my measure of 
unionized employees. In Column (1) I use the log of the percentage of employee ownership as 
my measure of employee ownership. In Column (2) and Column (3), I use an indicator variable 
for companies with employee ownership as my measure of employee ownership. In Column (4), 




sample observations of the percentage of employee ownership as my measure of employee 
ownership. 
 [Insert Table 16] 
In Column (3), the interaction between Union Rate and Employee Ownership Indicator is 
not significant. This result suggests that employee ownership does not affect the effect of 
unionization on information asymmetry. However, in Column (1), Column (2), Column (4), 
Column (5), and Column (6), the coefficient on the interaction between unionization and 
employee ownership is positive and significant (p<0.05, p<0.05, p<0.01, p<0.01, and p<0.01, 
respectively). These findings are consistent with findings in Table 8 and support the idea that 
managements’ incentives to obfuscate information because of unionization may be at least 
partially mitigated by a shift toward shareholder incentives by employees. 
5.3 Controlling for Corporate Governance in Analyst Dispersion Models 
Building on prior literature that documents a positive association between corporate 
governance and disclosure (e.g., Eng and Mak 2003, Ajinkya et al. 2005, Karamanou and Vafeas 
2005), Byard et al. (2006) examine whether corporate governance increases the quality of 
information available to financial analysts. They find that analyst forecasts are more accurate 
when companies have better corporate governance. Consistent with this idea, I posit that if 
corporate governance increases the quality of information available to analysts, the consensus 
forecasts should be more congruent leading to a reduction in analyst dispersion. To control for 
the potential effect of governance on my analyst dispersion regressions, I re-examine Model (5) 
and Model (6) and include the governance measures Top Ownership, Board Size, and Outside 
Directors as follows: 
Analyst Dispersiont  = γ0 + γ1 Union Indicatort + γ2 Sizet-1 + γ3 Institutional Holdingst-1 




 + γ7 Return Volatilityt-1 + γ8 Analyst Followingt + γ9 Advertisingt-1  
 + γ10 R&Dt-1 + γ11 Top Ownershipt + γ12 Board Sizet-1  
 + γ13 Outside Directorst-1 + Year FE + Industry FE + εt,         (11) 
 
Analyst Dispersiont  = ζ0 + ζ1 Union Indicatort + ζ2 Log Employee Ownershipt  
 + ζ3 Log Employee Ownershipt*Union Indicatort  
 + ζ4 Sizet-1 + ζ5 Institutional Holdingst-1 + ζ6 BTMt-1  
 + ζ7 Segmentst-1 + ζ8 Foreign Segmentst-1 + ζ9 Return Volatilityt-1  
 + ζ10 Analyst Followingt + ζ11 Advertisingt-1 + ζ12 R&Dt-1  
 + ζ 13 Top Ownershipt + ζ 14 Board Sizet-1  
 + ζ 15 Outside Directorst-1 + Year FE + Industry FE + εt,        (12) 
 
All variables are as previously defined.  
 As with Model (5), Union Indicator is the variable of interest in Model (11). As before, I 
have no directional prediction for Union Indicator and therefore use a two-tailed test.  As with 
Model (6), Log Employee Ownership*Union Indicator is the variable of interest in Model (12). 
As before, I have no directional prediction for Log Employee Ownership*Union Indicator and 
therefore use a two-tailed test. I obtain governance data from MSCI GMI Ratings. After 
removing observations from my original analyst dispersion regression sample without 
governance data required for my governance variables, my sample consists of 2,323 company-
year observations. As with Model (5), I re-estimate Model (11) after replacing Union Indicator 
with two alternative measures, first with Union Rate, and then with Big Union. As with Model 
(6), I re-estimate Model (12) after replacing Union Indicator with two alternative measures, first 
with Union Rate, and then with Big Union, and after replacing Log Employee Ownership with 
two alternative measures, first with Employee Ownership Indicator  and then with Big Employee 
Ownership.  
I present the results from re-estimating Model (5) while controlling for governance in 
Table 17. In Column (1), I use an indicator variable for companies that disclose the presence of a 




employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement as my measure of unionized 
employees. In Column (3), I use an indicator variable for the top decile of insider trading sample 
observations of the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or collective bargaining 
agreement as my measure of unionized employees.  
[Insert Table 17] 
As with my results in Table (11) for Model (1), the coefficient for unionized employees is 
not significant in Column (2) and Column (3). These results suggest that neither the percentage 
of unionization nor a highly unionized workforce impact company information asymmetry.  
As with my results in Table (11) for Model (1), the coefficient for the presence of a union 
is negative and significant (p<0.01). As before, when taken together with the analyst following 
results, this suggests that, although fewer analysts follow companies with unions, those that do 
provide collectively more congruent forecasts for companies with unions than for companies 
without unions. These results are mixed and, when compared to the analyst following results, 
provide contradictory evidence about the effect of employee unionization on information 
asymmetry.  
I present the results from re-estimating Model (6) while controlling for governance in 
Table 18. As before, in Column (1), Column (2) and Column (4), I use an indicator variable for 
companies that disclose the presence of a U.S. union as my measure of unionized employees. In 
Column (3) and Column (5), I use the percentage of U.S. employees subject to a union or 
collective bargaining agreement as my measure of unionized employees. In Column (6), I use an 
indicator variable for the top decile of analyst dispersion observations of the percentage of U.S. 
employees subject to a union or collective bargaining agreement as my measure of unionized 




of employee ownership. In Column (2) and Column (3), I use an indicator variable for 
companies with employee ownership as my measure of employee ownership. In Column (4), 
Column (5), and Column (6), I use an indictor variable for the top decile of insider trading 
sample observations of the percentage of employee ownership as my measure of employee 
ownership. 
 [Insert Table 18] 
In Column (1), Column (2) and Column (3), the coefficients on the interactions between 
the union variables and employee ownership variables are negative and significant (p<0.05, 
p<.010, and p<0.10, respectively). In Column (4), Column (5), and Column (6), the coefficients 
on the interactions between the union variables and the employee ownership variables are not 
significant. Although these results provide slightly more support that employee ownership affects 
the association between unionization and information asymmetry relative to those in Table 12, 
the results remain mixed. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This study contributes to labor union literature by examining whether the presence of 
labor unions impacts information asymmetry. Whether unions impact a company’s information 
environment is an important question as part of the debate surrounding whether unions provide 
value to society as a whole. Information asymmetry describes the differing levels of knowledge 
about private information between company insiders and outsiders. Healy and Palepu (2001) 
summarize prior literature and conclude that the efficient allocation of resources in the capital 
market is impeded by information asymmetry. Prior literature finds that the presence of a union 
provides management with an incentive to obfuscate information in order to prevent employees 




unions may serve as monitors, similar to institutional investors, which should decrease 
information asymmetry. Finally, prior literature suggests that managements’ incentives to 
obfuscate information in the presence of unions should decrease with employee ownership as 
employee incentives become more aligned with shareholders’ incentives.  
I extend this literature by hand collecting from companies’ 10-K disclosures company-
specific information about the presence of labor unions and the percentage of companies’ 
employees that are unionized. I then examine whether company-specific measures of 
unionization are associated with information asymmetry, as proxied for by insider trading, 
analyst following, and analyst dispersion. I also examine whether employee ownership affects 
the effect of unions on information asymmetry. I find mixed results that provide inconsistent 
evidence about the effect of unionization on information asymmetry and whether employee 
ownership impacts the effect of unionization on information asymmetry. These mixed findings 
are likely because of the effects of competing incentives for information availability and 
obfuscation for management and employees documented in prior literature. The results of this 
paper should be of interest to public policy makers, investors, creditors, and academicians 
interested in how unions affect a company’s information environment as part of a discussion 
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Analyst Dispersion = the standard deviation of analyst forecasts in the final one-year-
ahead forecast for the fiscal year scaled by the mean of analyst 
forecasts in the final one-year-ahead forecast for the fiscal year 
 
Analyst Following  = the natural log of one plus the number of analysts forecasting in 
the final one-year-ahead forecast for the fiscal year 
 
Insider Trading  = the net purchase ratio, calculated as the number of net shares 
purchased by company insiders during the fiscal year scaled by the 
sum of the absolute value of the number shares purchased and the 
absolute value of the number of shares sold by company insiders 
during the fiscal year 
 
Variables of Interest 
 
Big Union = an indicator variable set equal to one if the percentage of U.S. 
employees who are unionized or subject to a collective bargaining 
agreement is greater than the top decile of observations included in 
a regression sample, and zero otherwise 
 
Union Indicator = an indicator variable set equal to one when the company’s 10-K 
discloses the percentage of company U.S. employees who are 
unionized or subject to a collective bargaining agreement, and zero 
if a company discloses in their 10-K that employees are not 
unionized or subject to a collective bargaining agreement 
 
Union Rate = the percentage disclosed in the company’s 10-K of company 
U.S. employees who are unionized or subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement, and zero if a company discloses in their 10-




Advertising = advertising expense (XAD) scaled by lagged total assets (AT) 
 
Analyst Following  = the natural log of one plus the number of analysts forecasting in 




Big Employee Ownership  = an indicator variable set equal to one if the market value of 




the number of company employees is greater than the top decile of 
observations included in a regression sample, and zero otherwise 
 
Board Size  = the total number of board members 
 
BTM  = the book-to-market ratio calculated as CEQ/(CSHO x PRCC_F) 
 
Employee Ownership   = an indicator variable set equal to one if employees own  
Indicator company stock through ESOPs, and zero otherwise 
 
Foreign Segments  = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company has foreign 
segments, and zero otherwise 
 
Grants  = the number of stock options granted to company insiders scaled 
by the number of shares held by insiders at the beginning of the 
fiscal year 
 
Institutional Holdings  = the percentage of shares held by institutional investors at the end 
of the fiscal year 
 
Leverage  = long-term debt (DLTT) plus short-term debt (DLC) divided by 
total assets (AT) 
 
Log Employee Ownership = the natural log of one plus the market value of company stock 
owned by employees through ESOPs scaled by the number of 
company employees 
 
Outside Directors  = the number of company directors who are independent, as 
defined by MSCI GMI Ratings 
 
R&D = an indicator variable set equal to one if the company has research 
and development expenses for the year (XRD), and zero otherwise 
 
Returns  = raw buy-and-hold stock returns during the fiscal year 
 
Return Volatility  = the standard deviation of daily stock returns for the fiscal year 
 
ROA  = return on assets calculated as net income (NI) scaled by total 
assets (AT) at the beginning of the fiscal year 
 
ROE  = return on equity calculated as net income (NI) scaled by the book 
value of common equity (CEQ) at the beginning of the fiscal year 
 





Size  = the natural log of the market value of equity calculated as 
CSHO*PRCC_F (or as the natural log of MKVALT if missing 
CSHO, PRCC_F, or both) 
 
Spread = the yearly median of the 12 monthly median spreads;22 
 
Top Ownership  = the percentage of common shares owned by the company’s top 
managers and directors, as defined by MSCI GMI Ratings 
  
                                                 
22 I modify Corwin and Schultz (2012) by calculating median monthly spreads, rather than mean 
monthly spreads, and then calculate the yearly median spread to follow Hilary (2006). Hilary 
uses the median spread to capture the “steady state” and to mitigate the impact of special events 
and outliers. My results are unaffected by whether I use the mean or the median and whether I 





Insider Trading Sample Selection 
 
US Companies from Compustat, Fiscal Years 2008 - 2010 24,322 
Less observations without required Compustat variables (12,199) 
 12,123 
Less observations without required insider trading data (6,109) 
 6,014 
Less observations without required return data (208) 
 5,806 
Less observations without required grant data (2,122) 
 3,684 
Less observations without required union data (2,055) 



















Insider Trading -0.369 0.828 -1.000 -1.000 -0.952 0.518 1.000 
Union Indicator 0.237 0.425 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Union Rate 0.066 0.159 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.749 
Big Union 0.098 0.298 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Size 6.266 1.751 1.380 5.043 6.231 7.481 11.060 
Institutional Holdings 0.623 0.289 0.000 0.390 0.674 0.873 1.000 
BTM 0.748 0.692 0.021 0.324 0.586 0.928 7.310 
Returns 0.139 0.790 -0.930 -0.329 -0.029 0.373 5.552 
Grants 2.231 8.822 0.002 0.089 0.350 1.066 101.572 
ROE -0.006 0.442 -3.219 -0.057 0.072 0.145 1.790 
Log Employee Ownership 2.102 3.738 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.868 
Employee Ownership Indicator 0.248 0.432 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Big Employee Ownership 0.099 0.299 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 






The association between Insider Trading and Unions 
 
 Insider Trading 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator 0.131**   
 (0.033)   
Union Rate  0.236  
  (0.166)  
Big Union   0.137 
   (0.150) 
Size -0.138*** -0.133*** -0.132*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings -0.069 -0.067 -0.069 
 (0.247) (0.253) (0.249) 
BTM 0.118*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Returns -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.465) (0.456) (0.461) 
Grants -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.122) (0.114) (0.115) 
ROE -0.244*** -0.243*** -0.242*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 1.331*** 0.870*** 0.810*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,629 1,629 1,629 
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.254 0.255 
The dependent variable is Insider Trading. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 
through 2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 
1 percent, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a 








The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Insider Trading 
 
 Insider Trading Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator 0.144** 0.161**  
 (0.050) (0.031)  
Union Rate   0.265 
   (0.172) 
Log Employee Ownership -0.002   
 (0.826)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  0.002 -0.009 
  (0.979) (0.871) 
Log Employee Ownership -0.004   
*Union Indicator (0.744)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  -0.084  
*Union Indicator  (0.428)  
Employee Ownership Indicator   -0.098 
*Union Rate   (0.691) 
Size -0.136*** -0.137*** -0.132*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings -0.070 -0.069 -0.068 
 (0.243) (0.247) (0.250) 
BTM 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.124*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Returns -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.463) (0.467) (0.452) 
Grants -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.110) 
ROE -0.244*** -0.243*** -0.243*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 1.324*** 1.329*** 0.850*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
    
    





TABLE 4 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Insider Trading 
 
 Insider Trading Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
N 1,629 1,629 1,629 
Adjusted R2 0.255 0.255 0.254 
The dependent variable is Insider Trading. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 through 
2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional prediction 






TABLE 4 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Insider Trading  
 
 Insider Trading Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
Union Indicator 0.114*   
 (0.077)   
Union Rate  0.187  
  (0.289)  
Big Union   0.088 
   (0.371) 
Big Employee Ownership -0.082 -0.070 -0.090 
 (0.375) (0.405) (0.250) 
Big Employee Ownership 0.156   
*Union Indicator (0.294)   
Big Employee Ownership  0.345  
*Union Rate  (0.257)  
Big Employee Ownership   0.270 
* Big Union   (0.145) 
Size -0.136*** -0.132*** -0.130*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings -0.068 -0.064 -0.062 
 (0.250) (0.266) (0.272) 
BTM 0.119*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Returns -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.463) (0.461) (0.472) 
Grants -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.126) (0.118) (0.117) 
ROE -0.246*** -0.242*** -0.241*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 1.319*** 0.868*** 0.835*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 





TABLE 4 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Insider Trading  
 
 Insider Trading Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
N 1,629 1,629 1,629 
Adjusted R2 0.255 0.254 0.255 
The dependent variable is Insider Trading. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 through 
2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional 







Analyst Following Sample Selection 
 
US Companies from Compustat, Fiscal Years 2008 - 2010    24,322  
Less observations without required Compustat variables  (12,426) 
    11,896  
Less observations without required return data    (1,952) 
      9,944  
Less observations without required union data    (5,797) 

















Analyst Following 1.463 0.958 0.000 0.693 1.609 2.197 3.401 
Union Indicator 0.229 0.420 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Union Percentage 0.065 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.749 
Big Union 0.100 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Size 5.860 1.792 1.380 4.561 5.835 7.053 11.060 
Institutional Holdings 0.552 0.315 0.000 0.281 0.589 0.835 1.000 
BTM 0.827 0.780 0.021 0.353 0.625 1.041 7.310 
Segments 1.272 0.897 0.000 0.693 1.099 2.197 3.045 
Foreign Segments 0.426 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Return Volatility 0.041 0.020 0.009 0.026 0.037 0.051 0.126 
Spread 0.917 0.515 -0.377 0.558 0.816 1.178 5.670 
Leverage 0.182 0.183 0.000 0.014 0.135 0.293 0.842 
ROA -0.005 0.182 -1.218 -0.019 0.017 0.068 0.781 
Log Employee Ownership 1.805 3.519 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.868 
Employee Ownership Indicator 0.217 0.412 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Big Employee Ownership 0.100 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 






The association between Analyst Following and Unions 
 
 Analyst Following 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator -0.162***   
 (0.001)   
Union Percentage  -0.497***  
  (0.000)  
Big Union   -0.177*** 
   (0.003) 
Size 0.288*** 0.285*** 0.283*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings 1.336*** 1.335*** 1.336*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BTM 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.456) (0.516) (0.545) 
Segments -0.037* -0.038** -0.044** 
 (0.054) (0.047) (0.027) 
Foreign Segments -0.003 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.470) (0.463) (0.557) 
Return Volatility 3.348*** 3.350*** 3.407*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spread 0.003 0.000 0.003 
 (0.446) (0.495) (0.442) 
Leverage -0.148* -0.183** -0.199** 
 (0.066) (0.031) (0.022) 
ROA -0.149** -0.152** -0.159** 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.018) 
Intercept -0.995*** -0.875*** -0.939*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by 
Company 






TABLE 7 (Cont.) 
The association between Analyst Following and Unions 
 
 Analyst Following 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
N 4,147 4,147 4,147 
Adjusted R2 0.664 0.665 0.663 
The dependent variable is Analyst Following. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 
through 2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 
percent, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a 








The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Following 
 
 Analyst Following Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator -0.191*** -0.188***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Union Percentage   -0.534*** 
   (0.000) 
Log Employee Ownership 0.000   
 (0.939)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  -0.016 -0.004 
  (0.703) (0.914) 
Log Employee Ownership 0.011   
*Union Indicator (0.148)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  0.088  
*Union Indicator  (0.197)  
Employee Ownership Indicator   0.129 
*Union Rate   (0.460) 
Size 0.286*** 0.288*** 0.285*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings 1.337*** 1.337*** 1.336*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BTM 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.481) (0.456) (0.516) 
Segments -0.039** -0.038** -0.039** 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.042) 
Foreign Segments -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.435) (0.434) (0.454) 
Return Volatility 3.397*** 3.386*** 3.379*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spread 0.003 0.004 0.000 
 (0.444) (0.439) (0.493) 
Leverage -0.144* -0.145* -0.183** 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.031) 
ROA -0.147** -0.147** -0.150** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) 
Intercept -0.954*** -0.968*** -0.856*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 





TABLE 8 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Following 
 
 Analyst Following Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,147 4,147 4,147 
Adjusted R2 0.664 0.664 0.665 
The dependent variable is Analyst Following. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 through 
2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional prediction 






TABLE 8 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Following 
 
 Analyst Following Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
Union Indicator -0.181***   
 (0.000)   
Union Percentage  -0.561***  
  (0.000)  
Big Union   -0.212*** 
   (0.001) 
Big Employee Ownership 0.038 0.055 0.065 
 (0.443) (0.250) (0.154) 
Big Employee Ownership 0.163**   
*Union Indicator (0.028)   
Big Employee Ownership  0.387**  
*Union Rate  (0.018)  
Big Employee Ownership   0.168* 
* Big Union   (0.053) 
Size 0.284*** 0.281*** 0.278*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings 1.344*** 1.345*** 1.345*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BTM -0.000 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.506) (0.570) (0.593) 
Segments -0.041** -0.042** -0.047** 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.018) 
Foreign Segments -0.003 -0.001 0.006 
 (0.465) (0.483) (0.569) 
Return Volatility 3.426*** 3.433*** 3.479*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spread 0.003 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.446) (0.513) (0.472) 
Leverage -0.140* -0.176** -0.195** 
 (0.077) (0.037) (0.024) 
ROA -0.148** -0.148** -0.156** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.020) 
Intercept -0.951*** -0.816*** -0.877*** 





TABLE 8 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Following 
 
 Analyst Following Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,147 4,147 4,147 
Adjusted R2 0.665 0.666 0.664 
The dependent variable is Analyst Following. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 through 
2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional prediction 







Analyst Dispersion Sample Selection 
 
US Companies from Compustat for the Fiscal Year 2009    24,322  
Less observations without required Compustat variables  (12,369) 
    11,953  
Less observations with analyst following of less than two    (4,812) 
      7,141  
Less observations without required return volatility data         (46) 
      7,095  
Less observations without required Union data    (4,110) 


















Analyst Dispersion 0.016 0.040 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.014 0.466 
Union Indicator 0.270 0.444 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Union Percentage 0.074 0.165 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.749 
Big Union 0.099 0.299 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Size 6.576 1.474 1.939 5.552 6.477 7.537 11.060 
Institutional Holdings 0.681 0.251 0.000 0.510 0.726 0.895 1.000 
BTM 0.701 0.626 0.021 0.321 0.555 0.883 7.310 
Segments 1.385 0.890 0.000 1.099 1.099 2.197 3.045 
Foreign Segments 0.453 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Return Volatility 0.038 0.018 0.009 0.025 0.035 0.048 0.126 
Analyst Following 2.006 0.575 1.099 1.609 1.946 2.398 3.401 
Advertising 0.008 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.192 
R&D 0.507 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Log Employee Ownership 2.109 3.745 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.868 
Employee Ownership Indicator 0.250 0.433 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Big Employee Ownership 0.100 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 






The association between Analyst Dispersion and Unions 
 
 Analyst Dispersion 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator -0.004**   
 (0.012)   
Union Percentage  -0.005  
  (0.293)  
Big Union   -0.000 
   (0.837) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.206) (0.160) (0.138) 
Institutional Holdings -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.076) (0.069) (0.065) 
BTM 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Segments -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.800) (0.861) (0.877) 
Foreign Segments -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.962) (0.952) (0.946) 
Return Volatility 0.486*** 0.487*** 0.488*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Analyst Following 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.416) (0.394) (0.353) 
Advertising 0.012 0.015 0.016 
 (0.334) (0.292) (0.281) 
R&D -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.503) (0.458) (0.449) 
Intercept -0.020* -0.019* -0.019* 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.058) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by 
Company 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,985 2,985 2,985 
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.199 0.199 
The dependent variable is Analyst Dispersion. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 
through 2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 
percent, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional 





The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Dispersion 
 
 Analyst Dispersion Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator -0.003 -0.002  
 (0.125) (0.170)  
Union Percentage   -0.001 
   (0.779) 
Log Employee Ownership 0.000   
 (0.508)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  0.003 0.002 
  (0.342) (0.432) 
Log Employee Ownership -0.000   
*Union Indicator (0.162)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  -0.005  
*Union Indicator  (0.123)  
Employee Ownership Indicator   -0.012* 
*Union Rate   (0.089) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.182) (0.161) (0.130) 
Institutional Holdings -0.005* -0.005* -0.006* 
 (0.062) (0.056) (0.051) 
BTM 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Segments -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.789) (0.796) (0.857) 
Foreign Segments -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.955) (0.955) (0.951) 
Return Volatility 0.483*** 0.483*** 0.484*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Analyst Following 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.393) (0.384) (0.365) 
Advertising 0.013 0.013 0.017 
 (0.323) (0.317) (0.274) 
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.460) (0.454) (0.437) 
Intercept -0.019* -0.019* -0.019* 
 (0.057) (0.061) (0.062) 





TABLE 12 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Dispersion 
 
 Analyst Dispersion Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,985 2,985 2,985 
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.200 0.199 
The dependent variable is Analyst Dispersion. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 
through 2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 
percent, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional 





TABLE 12 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Dispersion 
 
 Analyst Dispersion Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
Union Indicator -0.004***   
 (0.008)   
Union Percentage  -0.005  
  (0.227)  
Big Union   -0.001 
   (0.621) 
Big Employee Ownership -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) 
Big Employee Ownership 0.005   
*Union Indicator (0.148)   
Big Employee Ownership  0.011  
*Union Rate  (0.145)  
Big Employee Ownership   0.004 
* Big Union   (0.186) 
Size -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.325) (0.262) (0.236) 
Institutional Holdings -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.072) (0.069) (0.062) 
BTM 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Segments -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.751) (0.816) (0.826) 
Foreign Segments -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.965) (0.949) (0.945) 
Return Volatility 0.487*** 0.487*** 0.487*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Analyst Following 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.487) (0.456) (0.408) 
Advertising 0.011 0.014 0.015 
 (0.347) (0.308) (0.298) 
R&D -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.508) (0.457) (0.447) 
Intercept -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) 






TABLE 12 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Dispersion 
 
 Analyst Dispersion Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,985 2,985 2,985 
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.200 0.200 
The dependent variable is Analyst Dispersion. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 
through 2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 
percent, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional 






The association between Insider Trading and Unions with Governance 
 
 Insider Trading 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator 0.032   
 (0.628)   
Union Rate  0.021  
  (0.910)  
Big Union   0.096 
   (0.377) 
Size -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.112*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings -0.109 -0.108 -0.110 
 (0.225) (0.229) (0.223) 
BTM 0.183*** 0.186*** 0.185*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Returns -0.044* -0.044* -0.044* 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) 
Grants -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
ROE -0.180*** -0.179*** -0.183*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Top Ownership 0.004 0.007 0.014 
 (0.509) (0.515) (0.532) 
Board Size 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 (0.767) (0.773) (0.768) 
Outside Directors -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.263) (0.264) (0.262) 
Intercept 0.159 0.175 0.802*** 
 (0.528) (0.489) (0.005) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,179 1,179 1,179 
Adjusted R2 0.171 0.171 0.172 
The dependent variable is Insider Trading. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 
through 2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 
percent, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a 






The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Insider Trading with 
Governance 
 
 Insider Trading Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator 0.054 0.067  
 (0.495) (0.403)  
Union Rate   0.081 
   (0.710) 
Log Employee Ownership 0.001   
 (0.922)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  0.012 -0.003 
  (0.860) (0.967) 
Log Employee Ownership -0.007   
*Union Indicator (0.563)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  -0.100  
*Union Indicator  (0.378)  
Employee Ownership Indicator   -0.193 
*Union Rate   (0.475) 
Size -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.111*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings -0.112 -0.110 -0.113 
 (0.221) (0.224) (0.219) 
BTM 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.186*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
Returns -0.044* -0.044 -0.045* 
 (0.098) (0.100) (0.095) 
Grants -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) 
ROE -0.179*** -0.179*** -0.179*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Top Ownership -0.002 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.496) (0.491) (0.502) 
Board Size 0.016 0.016 0.017 
 (0.758) (0.757) (0.767) 
Outside Directors -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.273) (0.274) (0.270) 
Intercept 0.135 0.120 0.176 





TABLE 14 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Insider Trading with 
Governance 
 
 Insider Trading Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,179 1,179 1,179 
Adjusted R2 0.170 0.171 0.170 
The dependent variable is Insider Trading. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 
through 2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 
percent, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional 





TABLE 14 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Insider Trading with 
Governance 
 
 Insider Trading Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
Union Indicator 0.025   
 (0.722)   
Union Rate  -0.006  
  (0.977)  
Big Union   0.061 
   (0.594) 
Big Employee Ownership -0.046 -0.041 -0.065 
 (0.650) (0.663) (0.448) 
Big Employee Ownership 0.070   
*Union Indicator (0.658)   
Big Employee Ownership  0.170  
*Union Rate  (0.592)  
Big Employee Ownership   0.177 
* Big Union   (0.384) 
Size -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.112*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings -0.113 -0.108 -0.105 
 (0.223) (0.234) (0.240) 
BTM 0.184*** 0.186*** 0.186*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Returns -0.044* -0.044* -0.043 
 (0.095) (0.099) (0.103) 
Grants -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) 
ROE -0.181*** -0.178*** -0.182*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Top Ownership -0.001 0.001 0.005 
 (0.498) (0.503) (0.512) 
Board Size 0.017 0.018 0.018 
 (0.771) (0.780) (0.787) 
Outside Directors -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.262) (0.266) (0.260) 
Intercept 0.162 0.167 0.815*** 





TABLE 14 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Insider Trading with 
Governance 
 
 Insider Trading Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,179 1,179 1,179 
Adjusted R2 0.170 0.170 0.172 
The dependent variable is Insider Trading. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 through 2010. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. P-values are one-tailed 







The association between Analyst Following and Unions with Governance 
 
 Analyst Following 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator -0.158***   
 (0.000)   
Union Percentage  -0.481***  
  (0.000)  
Big Union   -0.162*** 
   (0.001) 
Size 0.329*** 0.327*** 0.325*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings 0.731*** 0.725*** 0.726*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BTM 0.015 0.008 0.008 
 (0.269) (0.362) (0.376) 
Segments -0.072*** -0.076*** -0.081*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Segments 0.008 0.009 0.016 
 (0.587) (0.597) (0.667) 
Return Volatility 3.997*** 3.986*** 4.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spread -0.066** -0.069** -0.064** 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.020) 
Leverage 0.119 0.091 0.072 
 (0.911) (0.853) (0.797) 
ROA -0.280*** -0.288*** -0.299*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Top Ownership -0.156 -0.171 -0.160 
 (0.936) (0.956) (0.944) 
Board Size 0.019** 0.016** 0.014** 
 (0.069) (0.104) (0.123) 
Outside Directors -0.014 -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.882) (0.838) (0.842) 
Intercept 0.005 0.063 0.081 





TABLE 15 (Cont.) 
The association between Analyst Following and Unions with Governance 
 
 Analyst Following 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,473 2,473 2,473 
Adjusted R2 0.597 0.598 0.594 
The dependent variable is Analyst Following. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. The sample is comprised of 
observations from 2008 through 2010. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. P-values 
are one-tailed when there is a directional prediction and two-






The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Following with 
Governance 
 
 Analyst Following Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator -0.197*** -0.193***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Union Percentage   -0.551*** 
   (0.000) 
Log Employee Ownership -0.014***   
 (0.005)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  -0.118*** -0.104*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Log Employee Ownership 0.017**   
*Union Indicator (0.022)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  0.131**  
*Union Indicator  (0.045)  
Employee Ownership Indicator   0.241 
*Union Rate   (0.114) 
Size 0.337*** 0.336*** 0.333*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings 0.734*** 0.735*** 0.730*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BTM 0.020 0.021 0.014 
 (0.403) (0.389) (0.554) 
Segments -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.074*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Segments 0.005 0.006 0.010 
 (0.555) (0.562) (0.603) 
Return Volatility 4.016*** 3.992*** 3.991*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spread -0.059** -0.059** -0.062** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.023) 
Leverage 0.130 0.129 0.100 
 (0.931) (0.931) (0.877) 
ROA -0.276*** -0.274*** -0.277*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Top Ownership -0.168 -0.168 -0.188 
 (0.949) (0.949) (0.969) 
Board Size 0.021** 0.021** 0.018* 




TABLE 16 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Following with 
Governance 
 
 Analyst Following Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Outside Directors -0.015 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.904) (0.895) (0.843) 
Intercept -0.079 -0.073 -0.020 
 (0.620) (0.644) (0.898) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,473 2,473 2,473 
Adjusted R2 0.599 0.599 0.600 
The dependent variable is Analyst Following. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 through 
2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional prediction 





TABLE 16 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Following with 
Governance 
 
 Analyst Following Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
Union Indicator -0.191***   
 (0.000)   
Union Percentage  -0.576***  
  (0.000)  
Big Union   -0.208*** 
   (0.000) 
Big Employee Ownership -0.165*** -0.142*** -0.120*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) 
Big Employee Ownership 0.242***   
*Union Indicator (0.001)   
Big Employee Ownership  0.560***  
*Union Rate  (0.000)  
Big Employee Ownership   0.224*** 
* Big Union   (0.007) 
Size 0.336*** 0.332*** 0.330*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Holdings 0.728*** 0.727*** 0.724*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BTM 0.017 0.009 0.009 
 (0.465) (0.704) (0.708) 
Segments -0.071*** -0.074*** -0.079*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Segments 0.006 0.012 0.017 
 (0.563) (0.623) (0.677) 
Return Volatility 4.109*** 4.098*** 4.090*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spread -0.061** -0.067** -0.062** 
 (0.026) (0.017) (0.024) 
Leverage 0.129 0.100 0.076 
 (0.928) (0.878) (0.813) 
ROA -0.282*** -0.280*** -0.294*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Top Ownership -0.166 -0.183 -0.174 
 (0.947) (0.966) (0.958) 
Board Size 0.022** 0.019* 0.017* 




TABLE 16 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Following with 
Governance 
 
 Analyst Following Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
Outside Directors -0.016 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.916) (0.863) (0.853) 
Intercept -0.069 -0.008 0.019 
 (0.664) (0.960) (0.905) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,473 2,473 2,473 
Adjusted R2 0.600 0.601 0.597 
The dependent variable is Analyst Following. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations 
from 2008 through 2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 
10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when 







The association between Analyst Dispersion and Unions with Governance 
 
 Analyst Dispersion 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator -0.004***   
 (0.010)   
Union Percentage  -0.007  
  (0.121)  
Big Union   -0.002 
   (0.410) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 
 (0.131) (0.107) (0.087) 
Institutional Holdings -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) 
BTM 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Segments -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.777) (0.836) (0.852) 
Foreign Segments -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.850) (0.832) (0.812) 
Return Volatility 0.433*** 0.433*** 0.433*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Analyst Following 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.139) (0.137) (0.109) 
Advertising 0.010 0.013 0.014 
 (0.299) (0.248) (0.225) 
R&D 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.300) (0.284) (0.283) 
Top Ownership -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.338) (0.300) (0.319) 
Board Size 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.855) (0.811) (0.807) 
Outside Directors -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.211) (0.235) (0.226) 
Intercept 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.878) (0.761) (0.728) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 





TABLE 17 (Cont.) 
The association between Analyst Dispersion and Unions with Governance 
 
 Analyst Dispersion 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
N 2,323 2,323 2,323 
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.319 0.318 
The dependent variable is Analyst Dispersion. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 through 
2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional prediction 






The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Dispersion with 
Governance 
 
 Analyst Dispersion Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Union Indicator -0.002 -0.002  
 (0.119) (0.112)  
Union Percentage   -0.004 
   (0.400) 
Log Employee Ownership 0.000   
 (0.370)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  0.002 0.001 
  (0.399) (0.555) 
Log Employee Ownership -0.001**   
*Union Indicator (0.035)   
Employee Ownership Indicator  -0.004*  
*Union Indicator  (0.070)  
Employee Ownership Indicator   -0.011* 
*Union Rate   (0.050) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.095) 
Institutional Holdings -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) 
BTM 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Segments -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.760) (0.766) (0.820) 
Foreign Segments -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.833) (0.832) (0.832) 
Return Volatility 0.430*** 0.432*** 0.430*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Analyst Following 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.118) (0.120) (0.126) 
Advertising 0.011 0.010 0.014 
 (0.290) (0.291) (0.232) 
R&D 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.260) (0.268) (0.271) 
Top Ownership -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.328) (0.331) (0.294) 
Board Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 




TABLE 18 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Dispersion with 
Governance 
 
 Analyst Dispersion Interaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Outside Directors -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.264) (0.246) (0.271) 
Intercept 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.814) (0.820) (0.713) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,323 2,323 2,323 
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.320 0.319 
The dependent variable is Analyst Dispersion. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 through 
2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional prediction 





TABLE 18 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Dispersion with 
Governance 
 
 Analyst Dispersion Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
Union Indicator -0.004**   
 (0.017)   
Union Percentage  -0.006  
  (0.148)  
Big Union   -0.002 
   (0.454) 
Big Employee Ownership -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.345) (0.259) (0.181) 
Big Employee Ownership -0.001   
*Union Indicator (0.859)   
Big Employee Ownership  -0.001  
*Union Rate  (0.873)  
Big Employee Ownership   -0.001 
* Big Union   (0.843) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.180) (0.149) (0.127) 
Institutional Holdings -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) 
BTM 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Segments -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.757) (0.820) (0.838) 
Foreign Segments -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.855) (0.839) (0.822) 
Return Volatility 0.432*** 0.432*** 0.432*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Analyst Following 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.170) (0.167) (0.134) 
Advertising 0.010 0.013 0.014 
 (0.303) (0.250) (0.227) 
R&D 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.294) (0.279) (0.278) 
Top Ownership -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.284) (0.251) (0.266) 
Board Size 0.001 0.000 0.000 




TABLE 18 (Cont.) 
The Impact of Employee Ownership on the Effect of Unions on Analyst Dispersion with 
Governance 
 
 Analyst Dispersion Interaction 
Variables (4) (5) (6) 
Outside Directors -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.230) (0.254) (0.245) 
Intercept 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 (0.914) (0.799) (0.767) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Company Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,323 2,323 2,323 
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.319 0.318 
The dependent variable is Analyst Dispersion. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. The sample is comprised of observations from 2008 
through 2010. *, **, and *** indicate significance at p < 10, 5, and 1 
percent, respectively. P-values are one-tailed when there is a directional 
prediction and two-tailed when there is not a directional prediction. 
 
